Appendix 798
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
LAW DIVISION: MORRIS COUNTY

Docket No.: MRS-L-2032-06

FAIRFAX FINANCIAL HOLDINGS LIMITED and
CRUM \& FORSTER CORP.,

Plaintiffs,
-against-
S.A.C. CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

787 Seventh Avenue
New York, New York

February 22, 2011
10:02 A.M.

Videotaped Deposition of STEVEN A. COHEN, taken by Plaintiffs, pursuant to Notice, held at the above-mentioned time and place, before Jeffrey Benz, a Certified Realtime Reporter, Registered Merit Reporter and Notary Public within and for the state of New York.
Q. You're going to follow the instructions of your counsel?
A. Absolutely.

DIR Q. Were there any other people deposed in connection with that investigation?

MR. KLOTZ: Object, and instruct him not to answer.

DIR Q. Was that an investigation into any conduct in which you were involved?

MR. KLOTZ: Objection, and instruct him
not to answer.
Q. Mr. Cohen, have you ever been sanctioned by any regulatory body?

MR. KLOTZ: You can go ahead and answer that.
A. Yes, I was, the New York Stock Exchange.
Q. And what were you sanctioned for?
A. I was sanctioned for --

THE WITNESS: I can answer?
MR. KLOTZ: Go ahead.
A. For a violation related to a stock called Anacom (phonetic).

DIR Q. What was the nature of the violation?
MR. KLOTZ: Objection, and I instruct

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A. I don't remember.
Q. Do you remember speaking to him before that?
A. Sure.
Q. It wasn't unusual to speak to

Mr. Sender, right? You just don't remember when you spoke to him?
A. I spoke to him on relatively rare occasions.
Q. About what?
A. It was probably -- I mean, I ran into him at auction houses, so there was art conversations.
Q. Is that the only thing you talked to Mr. Sender about?
A. Well, I mean, there was one time when he -- and I can't tell you when, this was many years ago, where he tried to talk to me on Fairfax, and I just had no interest in it.
Q. Okay. That was a January dinner meeting?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
You can answer.
A. I believe so.
Q. Now, you remember that dinner meeting?
A. No.
Q. How do you know that you had no interest in talking about Fairfax then?
A. Because what I remember is, whenever -I just had no interest in what he was doing.
Q. Okay. But I just want to understand -you told me you couldn't really remember whether you met counsel last week and where you met him. I want to understand how it is that you remember precisely that several years ago Mr. Sender tried to talk to you about Fairfax and you had no interest whatsoever.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. That's absolutely correct.
Q. So tell me what you remember about that meeting. Where was it?
A. I don't remember.
Q. When was it?
A. I would say, and this is just a ballpark guess, between, you know, five to seven -- four to seven years ago.
Q. Do you remember where it was?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember who was there?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember, was it a dinner?
A. I'm not sure.
Q. Do you remember anything Mr. Sender said in that meeting?
A. The only thing $I$ remember is, there was talk of him trying to get me to invest in his fund, and the idea, you know, he may have talked about Fairfax, and $I$ had no interest in it.
Q. Before you said you remembered that he tried to talk about Fairfax --
A. I just said he may have --
Q. Let me finish my question, sir. Your testimony a moment ago was that you remember talking to him years ago, and he wanted you -- he wanted to talk about Fairfax, and you said you had absolutely no interest in that.
A. That's right.
Q. Now, you said at this dinner he may have mentioned Fairfax. Which one was it?
A. He definitely mentioned Fairfax to me at some point. The issue is whether it was a dinner or not.
Q. Your testimony a moment ago is that: The only thing I remember is, there was talk to him trying to get me to invest in his fund, and the idea, you know, he may have talked about Fairfax, and I had no interest in it.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. What meeting are you talking about?
A. I don't know.
Q. But you're also not sure -- whatever meeting it was, now you're not sure whether he raised Fairfax or not; is that your testimony?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Go ahead and answer.
A. My belief is that at some point he tried to interest me in Fairfax, and I had no interest. The question is, you know, I can't remember if it was a dinner, or we met -- or we had a phone call when that was brought up. Either way, I had no interest.
Q. But you tie it to him also trying to get you to invest in his fund?
A. He's been trying to get me to invest in his fund for a while.
Q. And you were invested in his fund,
correct?
A. Absolutely.
Q. At the time you had this conversation, were you already invested in his fund?
A. I don't remember.
Q. How many times did he -- so he's always trying to get you to invest in his fund?
A. Sure. MR. VAN DE WATER: Objection.
Q. Even when you were invested in his fund?
A. He would either try to keep me as an investor in the fund when $I$ was in the fund, or when at some point we redeemed, he made an effort to keep me in the fund, yeah, have me reinvest in the fund.
Q. When did you first invest in his fund?
A. I believe it might have been early 2000s, but I'm not sure about the actual year.
Q. When did he leave S.A.C.?
A. He left in 1998.
Q. Did you invest as soon as he left?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Now, when you invested in his fund in the early 2000s, did he continue to talk to you
about the fund to get you to continue to invest or invest more?
A. He would -- he would keep me up on the results of the fund.
Q. And was that as a -- was that for the purpose of trying to get you to invest more, to keep your investment in?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Now, why would he be doing that, making those calls to you?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
MR. VAN DE WATER: Objection.
A. I have no idea what he was thinking.
Q. Well, you were an investor, right?
A. Uh-huh. That's right.
Q. So he would call and keep you up on the fund, right?
A. On occasion.
Q. And you were a substantial investor in his fund, right?
A. I'm not sure what that means.
Q. Do you understand the word "substantial"?
A. Yes, I do.

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call?
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A. No.
Q. You don't -- but you -- do you recall he called you?
A. He did call me.
Q. It wasn't a call from you?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. Okay. Is that the -- well, withdrawn. And you can't tell me when that call
occurred?
A. No.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. You can't tell me what was said on that call?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I just don't remember.
Q. Okay. But you do recall that the outcome was you just -- quote, just weren't interested, correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. What do you mean by "just wasn"t
interested"?
A. I wasn't interested in his ideas.
Q. You weren't interested in his ideas
period?
A. Period.
Q. Okay. So why was that?
A. Because I didn't believe in his work.
Q. Why didn't you believe in his work?
A. Because I felt that it wasn't up to my standards.
Q. Why was that?
A. Just -- it was just my belief.
Q. Okay. What -- when you say "was not up to my standards," what does that mean?
A. I questioned the depth of the quality of the work.
Q. How so?
A. It's -- it's my -- it was just my belief that he didn't do the quality of work that we do in my firm.
Q. What about when he was at your firm?
A. Adam was a trader.
Q. What does that mean?
A. He traded stocks. He was not an analyst.
Q. Okay. So just so I'm clear on what you mean by that, I know this is what you do for a
A. That's correct.
Q. And how does it get allocated to various funds?
A. There's an allocation process that's consistent over every -- mostly every stock or situation.
Q. Okay. Was he one of your most successful traders during his time there, or was he -- where did he fall in the percentiles?
A. I would say he was successful. I don't remember if he was the most successful.
Q. I didn't ask if he was the most but was he one of the better traders?
A. Yes, he was.
Q. Did he leave, or did you ask him to leave?
A. He left.
Q. Okay. And when he left, you -- your view of his work, of his trading changed?
A. No. Actually, I -- I thought he was a very good trader.
Q. So when you say you weren't interested in his ideas, your point was, you're not interested in his investment ideas; is that right?
A. Well, later on, yes.
Q. Why later on?
A. Because that's the question you asked me, when I was interested, before, and that was 2005, and I just wasn't interested in his work.
Q. Okay. You weren't interested in any of his work?
A. Pretty much.
Q. Were you interested in his work when he was at S.A.C.?
A. Only his technical work.
Q. Why did you invest in his fund?
A. Because I thought I could make money.
Q. Did you?
A. I -- I don't -- I don't remember the actual cumulative total.
Q. Do you remember generally whether you made money or lost money?
A. I believe I made money early in my -- in the investing with him, and then later on I know he had some losses, and I'm not sure when and how much.
Q. You withdrew from his investment, according to Mr. Nussbaum, for performance

A. I -- I don't remember.
Q. Did you have one back in 2002?
A. That -- I just don't remember.
Q. Who is Peter Schwartz?
A. He's a trading assistant for one of my portfolio managers.
Q. How long has he been a trading assistant?
A. I -- I don't remember the amount of years. I would say between five and ten years.
Q. Do you also know a Peter Schwartz who was in real estate?
A. I don't know who that is.
Q. You don't know any other Peter Schwartz or Mr. Schwartz who was involved in real estate?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Is Peter Schwartz still employed by you?
A. Yes, he is.
Q. Does he know Mr. Contogouris?
A. I have no idea.
Q. Were you ever introduced to

Mr. Contogouris by him?
A. I don't remember.
Q. So you could have been?
reasons. In this case it's my belief that he's angry.
Q. Okay. But what is your understanding of the facts in this case, sir?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The -- I -- I don't understand the question. You're going to have to be more specific.
Q. Well, when you say someone brought a case because they're angry, are you suggesting they brought it even though it doesn't have merit? They couldn't have brought it because it was a mexitorious claim?
A. You know, I don't know enough about the case to make a judgment on that.
Q. But you did make a judgment that he brought it because he was angry?
A. Yeah, it's my belief that when you bring a lawsuit in a case, that, you know, he's angry.
Q. But you don't have a view as to whether it has merit?
A. I have no view on that.
Q. Now, what was your basis for saying your company shouldn't be in the lawsuit?
A. Because of my belief that, you know, we -- in how we acted, that we were -- we were -I believe I'm in that -- I'm in the lawsuit because of marquee value.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. Meaning that, you know, I'm a well-known guy and -- on Wall Street.
Q. You don't think you're in the lawsuit because you were actually shorting Fairfax shares?
A. No. I -- actually, my belief is that his judgment, or whoever is suing me, and my involvement in this case is totally off base.
Q. What was your involvement -- as you understand it here, what do you recall about your firm's involvement?
A. Whatever --

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I recall we traded the stock in 2002. I recall we traded the stock in 2003. In conversations with counsel, I recall trading the stock in 2006, in my firm.
Q. Is that -- have you given me the sum and substance of your entire understanding of the facts that relate to S.A.C.?

MR. BOWE: Counsel -- are you done?
MR. KLOTZ: If you don't like it, you
can follow it.
MR. BOWE: I will. Are you done?
MR. KLOTZ: Am I done? Yes. He's not. I'd like to have your question reread and his answer to it.

MR. BOWE: Why don't you find his question.
Q. Listen to the question carefully, sir. I don't want to know what documents you looked at, because previously counsel objected to that and asserted privilege. What I want to know is, sitting here today, after that process, what is your best recollection of the facts of this case.

MR. KLOTZ: Read the question back.
(The record was read back.)
MR. KLoTZ: And I object to the form of that question, but you can go ahead and answer it.
A. It's going to be a long-winded answer.

MR. KLOTZ: That's fine.
A. What I understand is the firm had a short position in 2002. We started covering the
short position in late 2002. And I believe we were covering that position into this report that you mentioned, this -- this -- this report that -from the Morgan Keegan analyst in January of 2003. I believe we had a very small position left into the issuance of that report.

I was shown -- I was told there was trading in 2004 that I didn't remember, and there was trading in Fairfax in 2006, when S\&P, I think, downgraded Fairfax, or put it on watch, and we went short Fairfax; and then maybe a week later or a few days later, I'm not sure, we covered with a loss.
Q. Is that the sum and substance of your recollection?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there any part of that recollection that's not based on what your lawyers told you?
A. I think what my lawyers did was showed me the trading in Fairfax and jogged my memory.
Q. Okay, So now, before they did that, you had no independent recoljection of any of the events that are related to the complaint?
A. I had a general idea that we were in

Fairfax. I didn't have what's -- I didn't have with certitude how we had handled the position in Fairfax from 2002 into 2003. I had no knowledge of trading that $I$ remember in 2004. And they jogged my memory on the trading in Fairfax in 2006.
Q. Okay. Did they jog your memory about getting a Bloomberg from Adam Sender, before you started shorting in 2006, about Fairfax?
A. Yes, they did.
Q. Okay. What did that jog your memory on?
A. I didn't remember that, but my counsel mentioned that.
Q. Okay. So now you're aware that just before you started shorting in '06 again, you got an e-mail from Adam Sender -- Bloomberg from Adam Sender telling you that he thought Fairfax was going to be what?
A. Showed me a -- a -- an -- actually, he -- the exact -- if I remember correctly, that it was going to be like PXRE.
Q. Which was what?
A. Which -- I knew as an insurance company but not much else.
people in your group not to trade in those securities?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. Withdrawn.

Did anyone at the time after you received the e-mails indicating that people in your group expected the Morgan Keegan report that had John Gwynn's initial report to come out the following week, were any of those people told not to trade?

MS. BARNHOUSE: Objection. Form.
A. The answer is, I have no knowledge about that. And based on the documents that were shown to me, I -- I -- it doesn't look that way.
Q. Now, if, in fact, people from -- people from your group had information from Morgan Keegan that a report was coming out, they should have been told to stop trading, correct?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Not necessarily.

MS. BARNHOUSE: Objection to form.
Q. What is your understanding of what their obligations would have been?
A. If they -- like -- it gets to --

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2 where -- was it a rumor, was it a fact? If
3 they -- if we -- in my testimony, we talked about
4 if you know that a report's coming out for
5 certain, and you know it's coming from -- from the person writing it or someone working for the firm where you know it's coming out, I would advise not to trade on it.

If it's a rumor in the marketplace, they -- you know, and -- and unsubstantiated, then I would say that it would a totally different situation, I'll be more -- more amenable to trade on it.
Q. My question was, if people in your group had it from Morgan Keegan that a report was coming out next week, they should not have been trading in a security, correct?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Well, not necessarily again. I can think of -- if you -- possibilities where if you're buying the stock, and the recommended -recommendation, if you believe, you know, that it's coming from Morgan Keegan, and it's a sell, then I would have no problem with buying stock in front of a report like that.
Q. Okay. So when you say you would have no problem, you think that would be legal?
A. Yes.
Q. You think that would be consistent with the SEC rules on trading on inside information?
A. The way I understand the rules on trading on inside information, it's very vague.
Q. Are you familiar with Rule 10b5-1?
A. No. No, I -- not that -- you would have to explain it to me.
Q. Okay do you have an understanding that when in possession of material nonpublic information you're ever allowed to trade in the security?
A. That's not the way it's explained to me.
Q. So you believe you can trade while in possession of material nonpublic information?
A. I believe that if you're -- if -- if the result is that you are trading on the other side of the -- you know -- in this case the way I understand it is, he was going to give a sell recommendation. I have no problem if you're -- to buy stock in front of a sell recommendation.
Q. Even if -- even if you have possession
of that sell recommendation and no one else does?
A. Yes.
Q. That's -- that would be okay at S.A.C.?
A. Yes.
Q. And that would be part of S.A.C.'s practices?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The answer is, it's not part of any practice. It would be -- I have no problem with going against a -- an analyst recommendation.
Q. Okay. Now, the S.A.C. compliance manual at the time provided that if you were in possession of material nonpublic information, you could not trade, period, correct?
A. Yes. Well, the way --
Q. Is that correct?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Actually, I don't know what it says.
Q. Okay. So you don't know -- at the time you didn't know what S.A.C.'s compliance manual said on insider trading?
A. When it comes to trading, I rely on Counsel.
Q. Okay. Did anyone consult counsel with
respect to these trades?
A. I have no idea.
Q. Okay. Now, is it your testimony, as the head of the firm at this time, other than consulting counsel, you didn't know what the compliance manual said?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form,
A. It's -- the answer is, I've read the compliance manual but $I$ don't remember exactly what it says.
Q. Do you recall that it said that if you're in possession of material nonpublic information, you cannot trade in that security?
A. Answer is, I don't remember.
Q. Do you know today whether your compliance manual says that if you are in possession of material nonpublic information, you can't trade it?
A. I've read it and I will say again, if -if -- if there's an analyst recommendation and you're going to the other way, I have no problem with that.
Q. My question was, do you know today whether your compliance manual says that if you're

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2 in possession of material nonpublic information, 3 you can't trade, period?
A. I don't remember what it says.
Q. So you don't know today, sitting here today as the head of the firm, what your compliance manual says?
A. That's right. I've read it. But if you're asking me what it says today, I don't remember.
Q. Are you concerned at all that what you're telling me would be okay would be contrary to your compliance manual?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The answer is, when you're trading securities, it's a judgment call. Whatever the compliance manual says, it probably doesn't take into account every -- every potential situation.
Q. Okay. So the compliance manual -- you have authority, Stevey Cohen, to ignore the compliance manual?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form. And I particularly object to the obnoxious, deliberate use of "Stevey" in addressing Mr. Cohen.

MR. BOWE: It wasn't deliberate. It was a mistake.

MR. KLOTZ: No, it was intentional,
Mr. Bowe. Knock it off.
MR. BOWE: How do you know?
MR. KLOTZ: Because I know.
MR. BOWE: I know you're trying to be a tough guy in front of your client, but why don't you knock it off? I know you're trying to be a tough -- defend your big client. I understand that. This was a mistake.
Q. I'm sorry I used the word "Stevey" if I offended you.
A. I'm not a big client.
Q. If I offended you, I apologize. I'll the word steven from now on.

MR. KLOTZ: Why don't you use the word
Mr. Cohen?
MR. BOWE: Steven Cohen.
MR. KLOTZ: Why don't you call him
Mr. Cohen.
MR. BOWE: I'll tell you what, Marty,
I'll question this witness however I like. MR. KLOTZ: I just ask that you be
professional.
MR. BOWE: You know what's not professional is when you accuse someone of doing something intentionally when you have no idea whether they did or didn't. Okay. That's not professional.
Q. Mr. Cohen --

MR. BOWE: Can you read back my
question?
Withdrawn. I'll rephrase it.
Q. So is it your testimony, Mr. Cohen, that you are able to ignore an unequivocal direction in the compliance manual concerning insider trading?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Go ahead and answer.
A. The answer would be if $I$ have a different belief than what's in the compliance manual, I would go to counsel.
Q. Okay. And nobody went to counsel, that you know of, with respect to these trades, right?
A. I have no knowledge of it now.
Q. Now, you also know -- you were also aware that a story was coming out in Forbes prior to it coming out during the same time period,
receiving that e-mail, you made any inquiry from these people as to what they --
A. I don"t remember receiving the e-mail.
Q. Let me finish my question. Do you recall at the time of that e-mail
that you made any -- took any steps to inquire from the people who had sent it about what information they had received from that reporter? MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I don't remember.
Q. Okay. Now, you understand, do you not, that it's illegal to trade in front of a newspaper report, correct?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. You know, I'm not so sure about that.
Q. What is your understanding?
A. My understanding is, you can talk to reporters -- I mean, first -- you may not know what direction a report is going to be suggesting. Okay? I mean, it could be a great report, could be a lousy report.

If you have knowledge about what the guy's going to write, I would say, you know, you might want to restrict yourself. If -- if a
reporter is calling and you don't know sort of what his angle is, or why he's writing -- writing a report, I would say you don't need to restrict yourself.
Q. So if you know from a reporter it's going to be a negative story, you shouldn't trade, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I would say that if you know a reporter is going to write a negative story on a stock, I would say you should probably refrain.
Q. Okay. Now, did you tell anyone at the time in your group not to trade in Fairfax securities after you got that e-mail?
A. I don't remember getting the e-mail, so the answer is, I can't -- I mean, the answer is probably not.
Q. Okay. It's not whether you received the e-mail or not. You're certain you got the e-mail, correct?
A. I don't remember telling people not to trade.
Q. Okay. And you're not aware of any facts where anyone told those people not to trade,
right?
A. I'm not aware of any facts.
Q. Now, do you know whether any of the people in your group, while in possession of the information reflected in those e-mails concerning the Gwynn report and the Forbes story, actually shorted shares?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The way I remember the -- the trading pattern, refreshed by counsel, was that there was a short position in 2002 that we were covering into 2003.
Q. Okay. Now, is it your understanding that it's okay under the law to be covering and transacting in those securities if it was -- if the -- if the nonpublic information you had was consistent or was contrary to your trading?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. Withdrawn.

It's your testimony that if people at S.A.C. were in possession of material nonpublic information concerning the issuance of the Gwynn report, they could, consistent with the law and S.A.C.'s compliance manual, trade in those
securities?
MS. BARNHOUSE: Objection. Form.
A. The way I understand the law is that if you are buying stock into a sell recommendation, which was what Gwynn's report was -- was what it was, then I would have no problem with that.
Q. Okay. It's not whether you have a problem with it. I want to know whether you understand it to be legal.
A. I believe it's legal.
Q. Why do you believe it's legal? Because you're not relying on it?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I believe if -- you know, because you're buying stock -- the way I understand the law, when it comes to material nonpublic information, is that if -- you know, they're trying to protect people who would not -- who -- who were taken advantage of.

In this case, if I'm buying stock into a sell recommendation, there is nobody on the other side that gets hurt.
Q. Okay. Is that your understanding of what the law provides?
A. The way I understand the law is that it's very vague, so it's an interpretation of the law.
Q. So your understanding of the SEC rules on trading on inside information is that they do not preclude unequivocally trading while in possession of such information?
A. I'm not aware of that.
Q. You don't know one way or the other?
A. No.
Q. That's not something you've ever asked to be educated about at S.A.C.?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. We -- I ask all the time, but I've never been told in this type of situation that what we were doing with -- what we were -- what we were doing was legal.
Q. You -- I'm sorry, did you say legal or illegal?
A. Legal.
Q. I'm sorry, legal or --
A. Legal, L-E-G-A-I.

MR. KLOTZ: Could you read the answer --
read it back and listen to it, make sure it's
your answer.
(The record was read back.)
A. Let me rephrase my answer.
Q. Okay.
A. I appreciate it. That the -- you know, the way I understand the transactions is we were buying stock in front of this report. It's my belief that doing so was not in violation of any SEC regulation at all.
(Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Section 240 10b5-1 entitled "Trading on the Basis of Material Nonpublic Information in Insider Trading Cases," was marked Cohen Exhibit 1 for identification, as of this date.)
Q. Mr. Cohen, I've marked as Cohen Exhibit 1 --

THE WITNESS: What do I do with this?
MR. KLOTZ: He will ask you to -- direct your attention to portions of it.
Q. -- Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Section 240 10b5-1 entitled "Trading on the Basis of Material Nonpublic Information in Insider Trading Cases." You understand, do you not, that
it is illegal to trade on the basis of material nonpublic information, correct?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I just answered that question.
Q. And the answer is yes, correct?
A. The answer --

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The answer is -- the answer is that in this situation, where there was -- a -- a supposed report coming out, that I have -- I don't believe that that is trading on -- on inside information.
Q. You believe it's not trading on the basis of inside information?
A. I believe that because I'm acting in the opposite way of the proposed report -- the report that was coming, and -- what you would expect the reaction to be, that I -- you know, that's perfectly fine.
Q. And it's perfectly fine because, in your view, you're not trading based on that report, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form. He already explained why he thought it was perfectly fine, but go ahead again.
A. The answer is if I'm trading on the other side of a report that is coming out, and in this case was a sell recommendation, and I'm buying stock, I don't believe S.A.C. or -- or anyone who has traded in that stock at S.A.C. has done anything wrong.
Q. Okay. My question is, is your reason for saying that they haven't done anything wrong your belief that they haven't been trading on the basis of that report because it's the opposite of what you're trading?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The answer is, they are making an investment decision that is clearly different than what was in this report and what was said, and -and being a buyer as opposed to what he was recommending, which was a sale. Therefore, the only conclusion I can come up with is they had a different investment view.
Q. Okay. And so a different investment view, why is that relevant to your understanding about this, that they're not relying on that report?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. My belief is that they have -- had their own investment view -- they've done their own analysis. It clearly, to me, looks like a totally different view than -- than what's -- what's being written by the analyst.
Q. Okay. And why does that make it okay as you understand the law?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The way I understand the law is, or the way that -- if I'm acting, you know, with my own view, and there's nobody on the other side getting -- my belief is those laws are in place to protect investors who don't have that type of information.
If I'm -- and if I'm acting in the other -- you know, in -- in the opposite way of what the -- the report intends to suggest, then there's nobody hurt. And therefore, we're obviously acting in our -- you know, with our own opinion, and therefore, you know, whatever the report says is irrelevant.
Q. Okay. And so when you say "we're obviously acting in our own opinion," what you're saying is you're not relying on that report, you
have an independent reason for doing the trade; is that right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The answer is, there are many reasons why you might do a trade. And the fact that somebody's coming out with a report suggesting a sell, you know, when we're on the buy side, is, to me, you know -- you know, all -- or that there's a rumor that it's going to come out is -- you know, part of the marketplace, and -- and totally acceptable that we can be on the other side.
Q. Okay. I want to leave the rumors aside.

I want to talk about material nonpublic information. So do I understand your position correctly, as the head of S.A.C., that if you know an analyst report is coming out, that you can trade in front of that if you're trading in the opposite -- with the opposite indication of the report as long as you have an independent basis for doing so?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form, but go ahead.
A. The answer is, if that's the reason why you're doing it, then I would have no problem with
that.
Q. Okay. So I'm trying to understand where your belief comes from. Your belief is hinging on whether or not you have a reason other than the report for doing your trade; is that right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. No. The reason is, the way I understand the rule, and why it -- it exists is to protect people who don't have -- are not in possession of that information. If I'm on the other side of that trade, there is nobody hurt in that situation.
Q. Okay. I understand your belief as to what the purpose of the rule is, but I want to talk about what the rule actually provides. Do you understand that distinction?

MR. KLOTZ: Objection to the form.
A. It's my belief that the rule is vague, and therefore, you can interpret the rule any way -- you know, with -- as a lawyer, you can probably interpret it in lots of different ways.
Q. You were about to say you can interpret it any way you want. That's what you were about to say?
A. I wasn't going to say that. MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. You started to say that, right? MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I don't remember what $I$ was going to say.
Q. Okay. So now you say the rule is vague. Is it your view that there is some ambiguity that permits you to trade on the basis of material nonpublic information?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. It is my view that if you're in possession of nonmaterial public information, you wouldn't want to trade unless -- and here is an instance, and there may be other instances, where in doing so you're on the other side of the trade, and therefore, perfectly acceptable.
Q. So your understanding of the rule is there are times when you are permitted to trade on the basis of material nonpublic information?

MR. KLOTZ: Objection to the form.
Q. Yes or no?
A. I can't give you a yes-or-no answer.
Q. Okay. So you can't answer for me yes or
no whether there are times -- withdrawn.
You can't answer for me whether you are prohibited categorically from trading on the basis of material nonpublic information?

MR. KLOTZ: Objection to the form.
A. If you're in possession of -- of material nonpublic information, I think we just -well, because the rule is vague, $I$ think we've just gone through an example of where I would accept that you could trade.
Q. Okay. And your example, the ambiguity is, if the material nonpublic information is something that is not something you're relying on, then you can trade?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form. That's not what he testified.
A. Maybe I'll help you with what I said.
Q. Please do.
A. What I said was, the way I understand the -- the law is that it was set up to protect investors who didn't -- who were not in possession of non--- of -- of material nonpublic information. Because in -- and here is a situation where we are on the other side of that trade.

Now, whether they were in possession of non--- of material public information, whether it was a rumor, I'm not clear. However, because in my view they were on the other side of the trade, and they were buying stock when there was a clear potential sell recommendation, either rumored or actual, then I would have no problem with my portfolio managers buying stock in front of that recommendation.
Q. Okay. And is it -- is it -- the reason you have no problem because nobody's getting hurt?
A. It's in my belief --

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
You can go ahead and answer.
A. It's my belief the law is there to protect investors who are not in possession of that information. Because I'm on the other side of the trade, I believe -- and the way it's been explained to me is that that law is there to protect investors so that they're not hurt by this. In our case, in this specific example, which is what we're talking about, nobody was hurt with us buying stock.
Q. Okay. And that's your basis for

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believing it's okay sometimes to buy on the basis of material -- withdrawn.

Whether or not someone gets hurt is the qualification on the prohibition against trading on the basis of material nonpublic information?
A. I will give you a second qualification.
Q. I just want to know whether that's a qualification.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. Whether somebody gets hurt.
A. The way I understand the law is, it was written that way; therefore, in this situation I have no problem with my portfolio managers buying stock.
Q. My question was simpler. I just want to know if I understand you correctly. Is it your testimony that there's a qualification to the prohibition on trading on the basis of material nonpublic information, and that qualification is that it's okay if no one gets hurt? MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. Yes or no?
A. I think we're -- well, the answer is probably -- the way you stated the answer, I think
you're confusing the issue.
Q. How am I confusing the issue?
A. Because the law is vague, and because of my understanding, given -- and in this situation it's my belief that buying stock in front of a sell recommendation is -- you know, even -- even if they knew the sell recommendation was coming out, I have no problem with that.
Q. Okay. I'm going to go back to my original question, sir. Yes or no, is it your testimony that's a qualification to the prohibition on trading on the basis of material nonpublic information, and that qualification is it's okay as long as no one gets hurt?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Because of the vagueness of the law, I believe it's a judgment call. In this case, we're talking about this case now, I believe that we acted totally appropriately.
Q. Okay. Now, is it also the case, so you're not saying that -- withdrawn.

Is it also your position that it's okay to trade in this circumstance because you're not relying on the material nonpublic information?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I can think of circumstances where if you believe that even if you were trading on the same side as a -- as a recommendation, if you felt or if you knew that it would have no impact on the stock, then I can theoretically suggest that trading on that stock, even -- while I might refrain from trading on that stock, if you believe that would have no impact on the stock, that therefore, I -- theoretically, you might be able to trade on that stock even if you knew that was coming out.
Q. My question was, is there any part of your belief and understanding that these trades was -- were appropriate, that depends on a view that it's okay as long as you're not relying on the material nonpublic information?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Just repeat that again.
Q. I'll withdraw it and try it a different way.

Would you agree with me or disagree with me that once in possession of material nonpublic information, you are trading on the basis of it
once you have it?
MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I think that would be a very narrow view.
Q. What do you mean, a very narrow view?
A. Because there's lots of reasons why you would trade.
Q. And that's what I'm trying to get at. Is it your view as long as you have another basis, you're not -- you can say, I'm not trading on that material nonpublic information, and therefore, it's okay, while in possession of that information?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I think it really depends on a situation-by-situation basis. I don't think this is an easy question to answer.
Q. Okay. So it's -- it depends on --
A. Now, what I might do is different from -- what I might do personally, or what I'll want -- you know, what my GC would recommend, in -- to be cautious, or to -- might not necessarily be necessarily the right decision.
Q. Okay. But we already know the
compliance manual says that if you're in possession of material nonpublic information, you do not trade, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Well, that's what it says. But like I said before, I'm sure it says it somewhere. And if you're asking me if I remember where it is in -- you know, I'm sure it says that in the compliance manual.
Q. So -- but my question is whether or not it's your position that it's legal to trade while in possession of material --
A. You know what I'm going to do? I'm going to revise my compliance manual.
Q. How so?
A. Well, you know, maybe we can provide an example like we're talking about today, where -to provide maybe a little bit more clarity on our views, or what we think is acceptable.
Q. Okay. And how would you do that?
A. You know, by -- be a perfect example, you know, where maybe I would include, you know, where there's a sell recommendation, if you're on the buy side, I would have no problem with -- so I
A. I -- I'll say it again. If you're on the other side of the proposed -- or the expected movement in the stock, I would have no problem with that.
Q. Okay. Is that legal?
A. I have no idea.
Q. If you take a look at Exhibit 1, look at paragraph B. Could you read it?
A. Definition -- is that what we're talking about?
Q. Yes.
A. Definition of -- on the basis of -"basis of subject to the affirmative defenses in Paragraph $C$ of this section, a purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is on the basis of material nonpublic information about the security or issuer if the person making the purchase or sale was aware of the material nonpublic information when the person made the purchase or sale."
Q. Okay. Now let's look up at A. "The manipulative and deceptive devices prohibited by Section 10b of the act, 15 USC 78 Jr and Section 2410b-5 include, among other things, the purchase
and sale of a security of an issuer on the basis of material nonpublic information about the security or issuer."

It goes on to talk about other things.
Do you understand that to be a correct statement of the law?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to form.
A. Are you reading A?
Q. A.
A. So I'm going to read it myself. Okay?
Q. Yup.
A. I'm a slow reader.
(The witness read.)
A. I don't know. I mean, it -- what -- I think I get it, but this is legalese, so.
Q. So what?
A. What do you mean?
Q. You said it's legalese. So what? It's not important?
A. It is important, but I -- a clause like that I would go to my general counsel for clarification.
Q. Okay. Well, you said the law was ambiguous. Okay? Here it says, "The manipulative
and deceptive devices prohibited include, among other things, the purchase or sale of a security of an issuer on the basis of material nonpublic
information about the security or issuer."

You see that?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is that ambiguous to you?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I don't rely on this copy to -- I rely on general counsel to clarify.
Q. My question is, is there anything ambiguous about the clause I read? MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I'm not sure.
Q. Do you understand from this that you are prohibited from the purchase or sale of a security of any issuex on the basis of material nonpublic information?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. If that's what it says, but I'm advised by counsel differently.
Q. Okay. But that is what it says, right?
A. I don't rely on -- on a literal reading of these laws of a paragraph. Okay? I rely on my

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counsel to advise me on what we can do and what we can't do.
Q. Okay. We'll get to some what you rely on, but my question is simply whether or not what I read is in any way ambiguous to you.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. Whether you rely on it or not is not what I'm asking.
A. I think it"s out of context.
Q. What context is it out of?
A. I don't know, there's a whole thing here.
Q. So it's not your understanding that -your understanding is that this is somehow subject to some doubt that the -- the manipulative and deceptive devices prohibited include the purchase and sale of a security of an issuer on the basis of material nonpublic information?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I'm having a hard time reconciling your view with the view of my counsel.
Q. I -- I'm actually not asking you to reconcile anything. They might be different. Okay? So understand my question the right way.

I'm just asking you whether what I read to you is clear.

MR, KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. That sentence is -- that sentence is -I understand the sentence.
Q. It's clear, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I don't know if its' clear, but I understand the sentence.
Q. Okay. And you understand it to mean that you cannot trade -- you cannot purchase or sell a security on the basis of material nonpublic information?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I'm having a problem reconciling your interpretation of that sentence and my general -my counsel's view on what we can do and what we can't do.
Q. Okay. I'm not asking for my view. I just read you the language. Okay? Do you understand the language to say --
A. Well, you asked me if it was clear.
Q. Is it clear that this prohibits the purchase or sale of a security --
A. No.
Q. -- of the issuer -- no? What is it about what I read that's not clear?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Because there's a whole context, there's a whole thing here, and I'm not relying on this paragraph or this sentence to dictate my view on -- on -- on that sentence and that paragraph.
Q. Okay. Now, let's look at what was -you having read Section $B$, on the basis of -- for the purposes of what is prohibited includes whether or not you -- withdrawn.

You are trading, according to Section B, on the basis of material nonpublic information by the mere fact you possess it. That's what Section B says, correct?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. We're having the same discussion, and my view is whatever a paragraph says I'm not going to interpret myself. I'm going to let my counsel interpret it for me.
Q. All right. You're -- you're the head of S.A.C., right?
A. Doesn't matter.
Q. That wasn't my question. You're the head of S.A.C., right?
A. That's correct.
Q. And you take compliance seriously, right?
A. Absolutely.
Q. You take not trading on material nonpublic information seriously, right?
A. Very seriously.
Q. Have you ever taken it upon yourself to actually read the rules?
A. I rely on my counsel.
Q. The answer would be, No, I haven't read the rules?
A. Well, I might have read them. I just don't remember.
Q. And you don't remember these particular rules until $I$ put them in front of you, right?
A. These particular words and sentences are -- if you asked me to say it myself, I would not be able to say it that way.
Q. Okay. Did you understand that you're trading on the basis of material nonpublic information by the mere fact you have it?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The way I -- when -- if I'm unsure about -- when I'm trading on something that might be material nonpublic information, I always go to counsel for clarification.
Q. Wasn't my question. We're assuming for the purposes of my question at the moment that there is material nonpublic information. Was it your understanding, when you came in the door today, that the mere fact that you possessed material nonpublic information means that if you trade, you're trading on the basis of it?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Let me just give an example where -according to your view, we're trading on material nonpublic information. My view is that based on counsel, that if we're -- we're transacting on the other side of the transaction, we -- it's perfectly acceptable.
Q. My question, was different, sir. Was it your understanding, when you came in the door today, that the mere fact that you possessed material nonpublic information meant that if you traded, you would be trading on the basis of it?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. There's a lot of reasons where you
transact, and that's a judgment call.
Q. I'll ask it again, sir. Was it your understanding, when you came in the door today, that the mere fact that you possessed material nonpublic information meant that if you traded, you would be trading on the basis of it?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Not necessarily.
Q. Now, Section B, why don't you read it?
A. No, why don't you read it. I don't want to read it.
Q. You can read it, sir. Please read it into the record.

MR. KLOTZ: No. Now, ask him a question. Don't tell him to read something into the record.

MR. BOWE: I can ask him to read it.
MR. KLOTZ: No, you can't. You can ask him a question, and he can give you an answer to the question. You want it read into the record, read it yourself.
Q. Mr. Cohen, please read paragraph B.

MR, KLOTZ: You can read it to yourself.
(The witness read.)
A. I read it.
Q. Okay. Do you agree with me that this provides that if you possess material nonpublic information and you trade in that security, you are trading on the basis of it?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Because of the vagueness of -because -- counsel advised me because of the vagueness of the law, I don't think you can come to an easy conclusion on that sentence.
Q. So you believe on its face this question -- this sentence is somehow ambiguous?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Based on advice from counsel, I believe it is.
Q. Apart from advice of counsel, the literal words, are they ambiguous?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The -- the words are interpreted -words are subject to interpretation. The -- based on the advice of counsel, their interpretation is that, you know, it is -- you know, that -- as that
understand from counsel that you're not trading on the basis of that information?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Say that again?
Q. Sure. Is your understanding from your discussions with counsel that in the circumstance you just described, you're not trading on the basis of that information?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I'm getting a little weary here.

MR. KLOTZ: We all are.
A. I'm trying to hang in there. You're going to have to do it again. Sorry.

MR. BOWE: Read back the question.
(The record was read back.)
Q. I tell you what, I'll rephrase it.

You keep citing your understanding based on your counsel. Is your understanding, so I'm clear, based on your conversations with counsel, that as long as you're not relying on the material nonpublic information, you're not trading on the basis of it?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I think that's a very -- because it's so
subjective, if -- if $I$ were in possession of non -- material nonpublic information, and I thought it was going to move the stock, and I was on the same side as the -- what -- what the expected recommendation would say, I would -- I personally would suggest not trading on it.

If you're trading on the -- the other side, where you've made your own analysis, and you view what is about to be published as irrelevant to your investment thesis, than $I$ would have no problem recommending it.
Q. Okay. So the reason you would have no problem is because you've made your own analysis and you have an independent analysis.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. Right?
A. My view is -- my view is you would -- I
would -- I'd be clear that you could trade on that.
Q. Okay. And because you have your own independent analysis, you're not, in your view, trading on the basis of that information, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Even if you had the information, and in
this case, whether -- whether people did or not, I don't know.

But if they did, and -- and they were in possession of that information, because they were transacting on the other side, based on the advice of counsel, I would have no problem with that.
Q. You know, you keep saying counsel told you something and you don't have a problem with. I'm trying to understand what it is about that that's okay. So let me try to try it a different way.
A. Let's put it a different way. I'm relying on counsel. I'm not making a judgment on -- to understand it. I'm relying on counsel to tell me what's appropriate.
Q. Okay. When did you get that counsel?
A. Well, you know, it's -- it's -specifically, I was told that last week.

In general, I've got counsel who has never refrained on anything like that.
Q. So you've actually brought stuff to him like that and traded on it?
A. I don't remember.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. Did you ever get that advice any time before last week?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. There are many times when I go to counsel.
Q. That wasn't my question. My question was, did you get the advice you've testified about this morning any time prior to last week?
A. I don't remember.
Q. So you can't remember a single instance in your life where you've been told what you came here and testified you were told last week.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The answer is, $I$ don't remember.
Q. Okay. So, prior to last week, how long had you been trading in securities?
A. 30 years.
Q. And during those 30 years, what was your view? Did you have a different view than what you were advised last week?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I had no view.
Q. You had no view as do whether or not it was legal or illegal to trade on the basis of
material nonpublic information?
MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. That's not what we're talking about.
Q. That is what I'm talking about. But it doesn't really matter. Did you have a view prior to last week in your 30 years of trading securities whether it was legal or illegal to trade on material nonpublic information?
A. It depends on the circumstance.
Q. So there are circumstances, in your view, in which it is legal to -- to trade on the basis of material nonpublic information --
A. Yes.
Q. Let me finish my question. I want to be clear.
-- that was obtained through some breach of fiduciary duty or misappropriated?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I think we got to parse the word "material."
Q. Okay, but my assumption is that this was material. We can -- we can go on, and we will, about whether this stuff was material, whether you knew it at the time. I want to know first what

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your understanding was, if you have material nonpublic information, okay, such as knowing the content and timing of an analyst report, whether, prior to last week in your 30 years, you thought i.t was okay to trade on that.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. In any circumstance.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I think I answered that before. But I'll be happy to answer it again.

Theoretically, if there was an analyst recommendation, and your view it would have no impact on the price of that stock, then theoretically, it would be viewed as not material. And therefore, you could trade on it.
Q. I understand, but I asked you to assume that it's material.

So you have an analyst report, you know about an analyst report coming out, you know what the rating is going to be, okay? And you believe it's -- it -- it might move the stock price.
A. It's my view that if you're trading in front of that report, in the same direction as the analyst view, where you think it's going to move
the stock, then my view would be, don't trade it, If you're trading on the other side of a stock, even in possession of that analyst report, my view is that that's okay.
Q. Okay. And prior to last week, that was your -- did anyone ever tell you that? MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The answer is, if I'm unsure about transacting in a stock, because it is a judgment call, I would go to counsel.
Q. Okay. But the scenario you just described, as I understand it, you're not unsure. You haven't been unsure for 30 years, right? MR. KLOTZ: Objection to the form.
A. In that scenario?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. If -- if $I$ was unsure, I would go to counsel. If I wasn't unsure in that scenario, then I wouldn't go to counsel.
Q. Okay, but sitting here today, you -your testimony is you're sure under that scenario that it's okay to trade.
A. Based on counsel.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Based on counsel's advice.
Q. And were you sure for the 30 years prior to you got that advice last week, that that was okay?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. While I can't give you a specific example. It -- it's highly likely there have been other situations like this.
Q. And in those situations, you would have traded.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Yes.
Q. And it is the case, though, however, that your compliance manual provides -- withdrawn.

The compliance manual in 2002, until whenever it was revised, provides that if you are in possession of material nonpublic information, you need to notify the general counsel, correct?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I think the answer to that would be, if you're trading in the opposite side of a transaction, in that case it would not be material.
0. My question was simply whether the
A. What was true?
Q. It is the case that it was you and
S.A.C. that got Spyro Contogouris involved in trading securities.

MR. KLO'TZ: Object to the form.
A. I -- I have -- I don't know if that's true.
Q. Okay.

Well, you did -- you did involve
Mr. Contogouris in your Hanover Compressor trades, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. What -- what is the question you"re
looking to ask?
2. I have a simple question. I said, You did involve Mr. Contogouris in your Hanover Compressor trades, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay.

Did you tell Mr. Watsa that?
A. I did not mention that.
Q. Okay.

Did you tell Mr. Watsa that you had paid
a lot of money shorting Hanover Compressor with S.A.C.? MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I never said that.
Q. Did you know that?
A. No idea.
Q. What was it -- why was it that you asked your general counsel to look into giving Mr. Contogouris a -- a ongoing relationship with S.A.C.?
A. It was probably -- I had guys working under me and they -- they probably wanted to have some type of relationship with him.
Q. Okay.

That would have been Mr. Behrens?
A. Could be.
Q. And Mr. Perry?
A. Possible.
Q. Okay.

And what work did they tell you he was
doing?
A. I have no idea.
Q. What kind of position did you envision for Mr. Contogouris?

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Compressor?
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A. I don't -- I don't remember. I don't remember.
Q. Okay.

So -- but you would have found out; is that right?
A. I don't remember. MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. You just said that it would be something that would concern you. If Mr. Contogouris was presented to you as a consultant, you probably would have found out what he was a consultant on, right?
A. You're asking me whether I did something or not. I don't remember.
Q. Okay.

Do you think you would have recommended
Mr. Contogouris for an ongoing relationship without knowing what it was he had done for your guys?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. It's possible.
Q. Do you think -- well, it's possible. Is it likely?
A. Well, you know, if it's one of them -it's one of those, like, all right, you guys take care of it. You know, I may pass it on to somebody else and let them do the work.
Q. Okay.

But you were the one who proposed to Mr. Nussbaum that Mr. Contogouris be considered for an ongoing relationship, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I don't -- I was told in e-mail that I told my general counsel to handle it.

Okay. That doesn't necessarily mean -can you rephrase your question again?
Q. I just wanted to know whether that was true.

So your testimony is you don't know whether or not you actually told Mr. Nussbaum to consider hiring Mr. Contogouris on an ongoing basis.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I -- according to the e-mails that -- or conversations I had with counsel, it's unclear that I was -- I was -- I asked my counsel to handle it.

|  |  | Page 202 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 |  |  |
| 2 | Q. Okay. |  |
| 3 | Well, you wouldn't have asked him to |  |
| 4 | consider or handle a potential relationship with |  |
| 5 | Mr. Contogouris if you were unhappy or concerned |  |
| 6 | with the work he had already done for you, right? |  |
| 7 | A. Well, I think the answer is: It was |  |
| 8 | something I didn't want to deal with. |  |
| 9 | Q. Okay. |  |
| 10 | So you would have -- did you at least |  |
| 11 | understand that he had worked on Hanover |  |
| 12 | Compressor? |  |
| 13 | A. I knew that part. |  |
| 14 | Q. Okay. |  |
| 15 | Did you understand that he had worked as |  |
| 16 | a consultant at Hanover Compressor? |  |
| 17 | A. I understood that part. |  |
| 18 | Q. Okay. |  |
| 19 | And then did you understand what exactly |  |
| 20 | he had done? |  |
| 21 | A. Not really. |  |
| 22 | Q. So that -- that would then concern you, |  |
| 23 | when they presented this person to you and said |  |
| 24 | this guy had helped. You didn't ask, "How did he |  |
| 25 | help?" |  |

A. I was not made aware of that.
(Document bearing Bates Numbers SAC
0035192 through SAC 0035204 was marked Cohen
Exhibit 2 for identification, as of this
date.)
Q. Sir, I marked as Exhibit 2 a document bearing Bates Numbers SAC 0035192 to 204.
(Discussion off the record.)
Q. Do you recognize the front page of this document?
A. Yes.
Q. What is this document?
A. It looks like a code of ethics and conduct.
Q. Okay.

Now, only a portion of that document has been produced in this case. That portion purports to be a portion regarding legal issues regarding trading practices. It's on page 8.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

On page 8, in bold, it says, "Important. Practices described below may involve serious
criminal violations of law as well as firm policy. Any employee who engages in any activity described below will be subject to immediate disciplinary action, including suspension or discharge from the firm."

Has that ever happened?
A. I was reading the thing. Go ahead. Try it again.
Q. Has that ever happened?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. What ever happened?
Q. Has an employee ever been discharged or suspended from the firm as a result of a violation of this -- these policies?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. Okay.

If you look at page 9, the first full paragraph is a discussion about what is material information.
A. On page 9.
Q. Page 9, first full paragraph.
A. I -- okay.
Q. You see the second sentence,
"Information is deemed material if a reasonable

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25 irrelevant" -- I'm sorry.

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"Information is deemed material if a reasonable investor would consider it important in determining whether to buy, sell, hold, or vote a security."
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A. I mean, it can be.
Q. But not always.
A. There -- I mean, I've mentioned instances when I would actually disagree. And that line taken out of context, I think these questions are much more complex than -- than a couple sentences.
Q. Okay.

But it's your compliance manual.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So I'm just reading the compliance manual.

What other context is necessary in your compliance manual to answer my question?
A. See, the answer to that is, you know, this -- this -- this manual is here to -- you know, to drive behavior of our employees.
Q. And your behavior, right?
A. And my behavior, absolutely. And it's my belief that, well, these are generally good
things to, you know, have your employees do. I think I mentioned a couple instances when that's not always -- you know, if you were to take literally what was said, and based on counsel, that, you know, you would come to a different conclusion.
Q. Okay. So you believe that there are situations when you could come to the conclusion that information that a reasonable investor would consider important in determining whether to buy, sell, hold, or vote a security, there are circumstances in your view as the head of S.A.C. where that -- such information would not be material.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I think the idea of material nonpublic information is a -- is really a judgment call.
Q. Okay.
A. Okay.

And -- and it's not always clear how someone -- even though in general I would agree with the statement, there are times when a situation is more complex than that.
Q. Okay.

So I just -- I want to make sure I understand what you're saying.

So you're saying there are situations when information that a reasonable investor would consider important in determining whether to buy, sell, hold, or vote a security would not be considered material.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. What I'm saying is that when -- when -in how I look at the world in -- and since we're talking about transacting -- because in transacting is what we're talking about in -in -- in this sentence, you know, whether one is trading on material nonpublic information or not, it's my view that, you know, this is a judgment call and -m and that sentence alone doesn't necessarily govern every situation and -- and, you know, I've mentioned a few today where, if you took the literal sentence, it would not necessarily reflect the way I felt about those situations.
Q. Okay.

Let me be clear. The sentence doesn't
say anything about transacting, right?
A. Uh-huh. What does it say?
Q. I just read it a few times. You can read it and tell me if it says anything about transactions.
(The witness read.)
A. Well, in a situation you're talking about that we're here today about, we're talking about a sell recommendation. I don't think in that case it would be material that a person is buying a stock when there's a sell recommendation coming out. I don't find that material.
Q. You don't find the information material?
A. That's right.
Q. To whom?
A. To the buyer.
Q. Okay.

But this doesn't talk about the buyer, right? This talks about to a reasonable investor.
A. Well, an investor has two choices. He can buy or he can sell.
Q. All right.

So it might be material to someone who is selling, not material to someone who is buying?
A. I think that's right.
Q. Okay.

Is that your way of conflating materiality with reliance?
A. I don't know what you're talking about.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I have no idea what you just said.
Q. You think materiality depends on who is actually doing the transactions; is that right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. It's my belief that the idea of material nonpublic informing could be interpreted differently, depending on which side of the transaction you're on.
Q. Okay.

So there could be -- as you understand it and your view as the person who's the head of S.A.C., there are instances when a reasonable investor might consider -- would consider information important but wouldn't be -- that you wouldn't consider that information material.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I think that's a judgment call whether you consider something material, important. If

I'm a buyer of stock and I think there's a sell recommendation, it's conceivable that I may not -that one -- I may consider it important, but I'm on the other side or not important because I'm a buyer of stock and it's irrelevant.

Because it's a judgment call with the individual and because the rules are so ambiguous, the way my counsel explains it to me, it really is a judgment call.
Q. When you say your counsel explains to you that the rules are ambiguous, how are the rules ambiguous?
A. Well, you know, we're having this conversation for about three hours about what's material and whatnot. It's pretty clear that you and I have a different view on it.
Q. Okay. What's ambiguous about it to you?
A. Well, there, you know, in this
situation -- this is a perfect situation to discuss that because here you're telling me you think a sell recommendation is -- is material. This is -- this is what you're telling me. Okay? This is your supposition.

And it's my view to a buyer that it is

2 not material. And if it is material, it's not relevant. Okay? It might be material to somebody else, but because he's on the other side of the transaction, it's not material to him or he views it as important to someone who is a seller and some -- but to someone who is buying stock, you know, it's -- you know, given what I've explained about how I have been told to interpret the laws as far as what they're trying to do to protect investors, if you're a buyer on a -- knowing there's a sell recommendation, you're hurting no one.
Q. So your view is materiality can depend on who is looking at the information.
A. I think -MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I think that same person could come to different conclusions.
Q. Okay.

Your point, though, is that you'd come to a different conclusion depending on what side of the trade you wanted to be on?
A. Not necessarily. You know, I mean, I can argue that someone else could think that a --
being short in front of a sell recommendation is a nonevent because it's not going to move the stock, and somebody else would think, you know, that's trading on material nonpublic information regardless if it moves the stock or not. These are judgment calls.
Q. Now, did you ask -- you did not ask counsel about this theory before trading in the stock in 2003, right? Your group?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I mean, the answer is that I'm always learning and evolving as far as things that are complicated, and I think the -- I think this -this discussion on material nonpublic information is complex.
Q. Okay.

You think it's complex whether or not information about upcoming brokerage research reports that you think will have an impact on the price is somehow complex and ambiguous?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I know it can be and it depends on factors such as I've explained, whether you're on the buy or sell side.

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Q. Okay.

Any other factors, except for what side of the trade you're going to be on? MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Could be a judgment on whether this is a market-moving event or not.
Q. Okay.

Now, in the emmail you saw from your group, they indicated that they believed the prices would be impacted by the Gwynn report, for example, right?

MR. KIOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I mean, the e-mails that $I$ saw, $I$ don't remember reading that the other day.
Q. Okay. And I'll go through those.

Now, look at page 10. Item 2,

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"Employees in possession of material nonpublic
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information are prohibited from tipping,
transmitting, or otherwise disclosing such
information to another person."

Is that S.A.C. policy?
MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I'm reading it here, so it's in the compliance manual.
Q. Okay.

Well, as the head of S.A.C., before I showed it to you, did you know that was the rule? MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I would never have passed material nonpublic information to -- or tip somebody. That's not -- that's something that I think is pretty clear.
Q. Okay.

You're not allowed to pass it along even inside the firm, right?
A. That I'm -- I'm not clear about. You know, that's a discussion that needs -- you know, I'm not clear that that sentence says that.
Q. Well, whether that sentence says that or not, is that the policy that you follow at S.A.C.?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I could see a situation where there's material nonpublic information being shared by other people, and those people come to conclusions such as this, the situation that we're talking about, where either, one, it's not material or, two, if it is, it's not relevant to -- because they're on the other side of the transaction.
Q. So it's not the case at S.A.C. if you have material nonpublic information, the only person you're supposed to communicate it to is the general counsel?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. That would be my preference, okay? And -- but $I$ could see situations like we just discussed where, you know, there may be no need to discuss it with counsel because of the situation we just talked about or other situations.
Q. Well, you said there may be no need because the person who possesses the information might decide it doesn't matter?
A. NO.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. We train our people to -- you know, to be very thoughtful about this. And my preference would be they go to compliance or go to general counsel. But I could see situations where they would make decisions because they understand that, you know -- or they have enough experience to know that what they were doing is okay.
Q. Okay.
So it's -- it's okay by you, at S.A.C.,
that people who might be in possession of material nonpublic information, they can make some of their own decisions at times?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The answer is my preference -- stong preference would be that they go to counsel, but if they're unsure. Okay? But if they're acting on material nonpublic information and trading on things they should not be trading on, I would not support that at all.
Q. Okay.

But you just wrapped the conclusion in there.

I mean, who -- do they -- it's your preference, but is it the rule that they have to go to general counsel?
A. The answer is we encourage -MR. KLOTZ: Objection. You got to give me time to get my objection in.

THE WITNESS: All right. We're getting late and I'm losing it. MR. KLOTZ: Why don't we take a break after his answer this question?

THE WITNESS: No. Keep going. Let's go.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
And, now, if you remember the question, answer it. Or if not, then we can have it read back.

THE WITNESS: Can you have it read back, please?
(The record was read back.)
A. I can think of many situations that are -- where there's material nonpublic information where people have had that experience and know what to do in that situation.
Q. Including yourself?
A. Yes.
Q. So there are times when you come into possession of material nonpublic information and you don't tell the -- the general counsel, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. That's correct.
Q. Because you think you don't have to.
A. Because I know how to conduct myself in the situation.
Q. Okay.

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Now, with respect to this -- this part about paragraph 2, it says, "Employees in possession of material nonpublic information are prohibited from tipping, transmitting, or otherwise disclosing such information to another person or entity."

So I'm clear, as the head of S.A.C., you say that doesn't apply to people internally talking to each other.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I think these are rigid interpretations and these are guidelines. These are rigid interpretations. I view these things as guidelines. Okay? And then because it's such a complex issue, you need to look at it on a judgment basis and on an individual basis.
Q. Okay.

So if you look at page 11, in the middle of the page where it says in bold, "Any employee who believes that he or she may be in possession of material nonpublic information should," the third bullet, "not communicate the information to anyone else inside or outside the firm other than the general counsel or his designee."

That's not a rule. That's a guideline. MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I would say it's a strong guideline.
Q. But not a rule.
A. I would say --

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I would say there -- there are times when people know how to -- know how to act in certain situations.
Q. Okay.

Then when it says at the top of the first paragraph on that page 11, second sentence, in italics, "Thus any violation of the firm's policy on the improper use or misappropriation of proprietary, confidential, or inside information is and will be considered extremely serious and will result in sanctions, including the possibility of suspension or discharge from the firm."

As I understand your testimony, one cannot follow these rules that are set forth in this policy manual and not be sanctioned or punished, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. These rules are guidelines, and I can't think of a situation where if someone did a serious -- made a serious violation, you know, that they had -- you know, those situations would be discussed by senior management and outside counsel.
Q. It doesn't say "serious." It says any violation will result in sanctions. That's not true, right?

MR. KLOTZ: I object to your
interrupting Mr. Cohen in the middle of his answer.

MR. BOWE: I'm sorry. I thought you were done.

MR. KLOTZ: Are you done or were you continuing to give the answer to the previous question?

THE WITNESS: You're going to have to repeat the previous question.

MR. KLOTZ: Read back the question and his partial answer.
(The record was read back.)
Q. I'm sorry. So were you done with your answer?
A. I'm not done.
Q. Okay.
A. I view these as guidelines, strong guidelines, deterrents, and -- but there are situations that don't require the -- the involvement of general counsel or outside counsel in making a decision.
Q. Okay.

This wasn't talking about decisions. This was talking about violations. And it doesn't mention serious violations. It says any violation will result in sanctions.

My simple question is, according to your testimony, that statement in the policy manual is not true.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I view these as guidelines. My interpretation of guidelines are that they are subject to interpretation.
Q. Okay.

So you could violate what's called here the firm's policy, which is set forth in this policy manual, and not be sanctioned, correct?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. That's against -- you're being very conceptual.
Q. Well, I'm reading your policy manual. It says, "Any violation will result in sanctions." What you hear from you is: You can violate this policy manual and not be sanctioned. MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. Do I have your testimony right?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. Okay. How am I wrong?
A. Because these are guidelines, I can think of situations where one would be in possession of material nonpublic information, act correctly, and not have to involve compliance or general counsel in that decision.

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Excuse me, Counsel.
I got to change.
MR. BOWE: Okay. We'll take a break.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the
record. The time is -- the time is 2:55 p.m.
This is the end of Tape Number 3.
(A recess was taken.)
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the
record. The time is 3:05 p.m. This is the beginning of Tape Number 4.
Q. Mr. Cohen, your answer before to my question was that you --

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Your microphone, sir?
MR. BOWE: Sorry.
Q. When I asked you whether that clause was accurate or not, you said you could think of situations where someone operated entirely properly and would not be sanctioned, which I don't think was responsive, respectively, so I'm going to ask the question again.
A. Which paragraph?
Q. Okay.

Page 11.
A. Okay.
Q. Top paragraph. Okay.

Now, when we're reading our statements of policies and code of ethics, that's the name of this document, right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And the document says that if you're in possession of material nompublic information, you're prohibited from passing it on to any other
person, including people inside the firm, right?
We established that, right? That's what

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it says?
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A. Let me read it again. First paragraph?
Q. No. We can start again.

So on page 10, paragraph 2, the statement of policies says, "Employees in possession of material nonpublic information are prohibited from tipping, transmitting, or otherwise disclosing such information to another person or entity."

Do you see that?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Okay.

And you just looked at the cover. This is, in fact, S.A.C.'s statement of policies, right?
A. No. I'm just looking at something.
Q. What are you looking at?
A. Looking at -- just thinking about the front page and the sentence -- the -- the paragraph code of ethics and conduct.
Q. Okay.

And then on page 11, it clarifies that
even further in bold and in all caps -- not -"All employees who believe that he or she may be in possession of material nonpublic information should," third bullet point -- "not communicate the information to anyone else inside or outside the firm other than the general counsel or his designee," right?

So those are the policies, right?
MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. According to the policy manual, right? MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. That -- you know, when I'm looking at this, these are policies, but they"re also a code of ethic and conduct. The way I interpret "code of ethic and conduct" is that those are general guidelines. That's what I think a code of ethics and conduct is.

And so while the vast majority of times that's exactly what I want an employee to do and to act, there may be times when there is no need for him to do this.
Q. Okay. So then the statement on page 9, just before paragraph 2 on page 10 that says, "As a
result, the following restrictions must be
strictly adhered to," is not true.
MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. When I think of a code of ethics and
conduct, I -- that -- those -- that -- that phrase
to me is general guidelines.
Q. Okay.

So -- but my question was different,
sir. My question is about page 9 where it says, "As a result, the following restrictions must be strictly adhered to," your point is that's not true.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. My -- my point is that these are general guidelines.
Q. Right. So if they're general guidelines, you're saying they may or may not have to be adhered to. This says they must be strictly adhered to. Those are inconsistent, right?

MR. KIOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I view this -- this material as deterrents and guidelines for our employees.
Q. Okay. I understand.
A. I can think of many situations when I

2 would want them to do this, but $I$ can think of situations -- so if you're asking me is it a hundred percent, I would say the vast majority of the time, yes, but there are situations when, because of the experience of the employee or -that he knows how to operate in a particular situation, that there is no need to go to counsel unless he's unsure of -- on how to act in that situation.
Q. Okay, sir.

My question is simply: In light of what you said, the statement at the beginning of the last paragraph on page 9, that the following restrictions must be strictly adhered to is simply not true at S.A.C.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. My view is that he's adhering to what I wanted. Okay? That he's acting in conduct, that -- that would make sense to me.
Q. Who?
A. And since -- the -- any employee that -that has a situation in which we're talking about. And since this is a code of ethics and conduct, and ethics, in general, can be interpreted and

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2 conduct, if it's consistent with what $I$ would expect out of an employee, would be consistent with this manual.

So, therefore, to pull a paragraph out of this manual $I$ think is taking things out of context and -- and I think the point is to conduct themselves in a way that the firm would want them to -- to act.
Q. Are you finished?
A. I think so.
Q. Okay.

My question is: The statement here, the instruction that says, "The following restrictions must be strictly adhered to," and then, number 2 is, "you can't pass on to anyone material nonpublic information," your statement is that does not have to be strictly adhered to?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. My statement is that if the person is conducting himself in an appropriate way and has the experience to know what to do in a particular situation, he does not have to always go to general counsel or compliance, even though there are times, and most the time, which he will.

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Q. Finished?
A. I think so.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

I wasn"t talk about the provision about going to general counsel. I'm talking about one before that.
A. That's my interpretation of this manual.
Q. Okay.

You keep giving me your interpretation and I'm going to keep asking the question until I get an answer to my question.

This says that the following restrictions, which include the restriction on not passing on matexial nonpublic information, must be strictly adhered to.

That is inconsistent with what you've just described as what your policy is, correct?
A. You know, when you take a paragraph out of context, I really take objection and -- because I look at this as a manual. Okay? And it's a manual of guidelines.
Q. Okay.

And this guideline is that the following restriction must be strictly adhered to.

So it doesn't have to be strictly
adhered to. It can be adhered to sometimes and sometimes if you've got good judgment doesn't need to be adhered to, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The vast majority of time it is adhexed to, but there are times when I can think of situations when it doesn't have to be.
Q. Okay.

But this doesn't say the vast amount of times, most of the time, some of the time. It says strictly adhered to. The fact of the matter is that language is not consistent with the practice inside S.A.C. as you described it, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Objection to the form.
A. In my mind, we're talking about judgment.
Q. So you don't have to strictly adhere to it. You can adhere to it in your judgment; is that fair?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. In my view, employees adhere and
sometimes strictly adhere to this, but because of their experience and their ability and their judgment, they might -- I'm not saying they would -- but they might, because of their experiences -- and they've been in that situation before. They know how to act.
Q. And, therefore, not strictly adhere to this restriction, correct?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Because they know how to act, they are adhering to the desire and the -- the intent of what the organization wants, and that's what this manual is there for.
Q. Well, the manual says you must strictly not communicate that information to other people. You're saying maybe you can, maybe you can't. I want to know which one is the policy at the firm --

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. -- the one you are articulated or the one that appears in writing in this manual?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I'm not going to change my statement.
Q. I want to know which one is the policy.
A. And I'm not going to change my statement.
Q. You don't have to change your statement.
A. Okay.
Q. Which one is the policy?
A. I'm going to say it again. We can be here all night if you want.
Q. Well, you can answer my question.
A. Okay. I'm answering your question.
Q. No. I want to know which one's the policy.
A. Okay. I'm answering your question the way I want to answer it.
Q. But it's nonresponsive, sir.
A. Okay. I'm answering it because I believe that the intent of this is to have the employee act in a certain way. There may be a time -- and I can think of times -- when he uses his own judgment because he knows how to act in a situation.
Q. Okay.

The intent of this is to tell the employee that they have to strictly adhere to a prohibition on passing on material information, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. That's the intent. The intent that you're pointing to is an intent that appears in words on a piece of paper, right?

MR. KIOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Let me rephrase what I'm going to say. There are times when $I$ might not go to compliance or general counsel because I know how to act in a situation.
Q. So is your testimony now that everyone else in the firm must strictly comply or strictly adhere to that restriction, but that you're saying sometimes you don't have to?
A. My --

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. My view of the person who knows how to act in a particular situation -- and these situations come up over and over again -- there is no need to go to compliance or -- or general counsel on every situation.
Q. But must you, in every situation, refrain from passing on material information to people inside or outside the firm?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I would not support passing material nonpublic information outside the firm.

I can come up with situations when we could be -- you know, there's some -- somebody telling somebody else about this, but they should know how to act.
Q. Okay.

So, internally, there are times when you would sanction the passing on from one portfolio manager, for example, to another portfolio manager material nonpublic information.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Well, we just went through a situation today where we've talked about your interpretation and my interpretation of a material nonpublic information. And it was my belief that if they were acting on the other side of that sell recommendation, they would be perfectly okay in doing so.
Q. I think that was nonresponsive, sir, and I move to strike it.

But let me ask you: If they had shorted securities under the same set of facts, you would
agree with me that that would be inappropriate, right?
A. It would be inappropriate if there was going to be a -- what we would consider a material -- a significant move in the stock. I can think of situations when it would not impact the stock and, therefore, would not be considered material nonpublic information.
Q. Okay. Does it have to significantly impact the stock?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. Is that your standard?
A. That's a hard interpretation, but I can think of situations where -- that that's a judgment call. And that judgment call would be that that -- there was the -- you know -- I can -I can think of situations where a sell -- a recommendation could be coming out on a stock, buy or sell, and, theoretically, it will not affect the stock and, therefore, in my mind would not be material nonpublic information.

The vast majority of the time, I would suggest and I would expect my employees not to

record.
(A recess was taken.)
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the record. The time is 4:01 p.m.
Q. Mr. Cohen, directing your attention back to page 9 of the statement of policies of S.A.C. According to the policy, another source of conduct that has to be -- or restriction is that must be strictly adhered to is 4, and that is, "Employees may not solicit, recommend, influence, or effect transactions in any security, commodity interest or any account, whether personal or firm, while in possession of material nonpublic information related to such interest."

Do you see that?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. You have to answer yes or no.
A. Yes. Sorry. Yes.
Q. Okay.

Now, that language -- that restriction that needs to be strictly adhered to, according to your policy manual, doesn't include any of the qualifications that you talked about at length this morning; is that right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Well, the way I would answer that is I'm the owner of the firm and this is my firm, and so it's my belief that these paragraphs are there as deterrents and they are there for employees to -for the vast majority of times.

But there are times when it would be entirely appropriate for the employee not to go through these procedures because they have experience in the particular situation and they know how to handle themselves, and in no circumstances would I want people to not handle themselves in a way that I think would be appropriate.
Q. You say -- your answer is, "I'm the owner the firm and this is my firm," that is to say, you set the policy at the firm, right?
A. I would say that the policy is set by a number of people, by my compliance people, my legal people, and -- and the business people.
Q. Okay. But it's your firm and you're the owner the firm, and if you say you want it one way, that's the way it goes, right?
A. The answer is I -- I've always been
Q. Okay.

But the point is you have to go along with it, fair?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The answer is: It's -- unless -- if I voice, you know, extreme disapproval or disapproval -- if I'm mildly disapproving, there are times I'll say, "All right. Let's go ahead and do it."
Q. But you're the one who always has to say yea or nay.
A. Not always. If it's not an important decision, I don't have to.
Q. Okay.

But on importance decisions that rise to your level, you're the one who has the final decision making, right?
A. I always have the right to overturn any decision or any thought that $I$ think is inappropriate for firm.
Q. And no one has a right to overturn you at the firm?
A. No one has the right to overturn me.
Q. Now, getting back to my question

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regarding page 9 and page 10 of your policy manual, is it -- is it your testimony that because it's your firm, what you're telling me is that the literal terms of this compliance manual don't actually apply at S.A.C.?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. When $I$ look at this manual, I see guidelines. It's a code of ethics. It's a code of conduct. It's what we want our people to do. Just like in any situation, you don't want your employees to act like robots. There are times when it's important because decisions have to be made that, you know, there are times when people have enough experience and have been in the situation before that there's really no need because they're carrying the intent of what this manual wants them to do.
Q. There's no need for what? To following the manual?
A. No. There's no need to go to general counsel or go to compliance because they know they've been in the situation before. They show good judgment and they know how to act.
Q. Okay.

But that's not what this section -- this section doesn't talk about going to compliance or general counsel.
A. Yeah. My view --
Q. The section -- let me finish my question.

The section I'm referring to is the one that says, "The following restrictions must be strictly adhered to," and number 4 says, "employees may not solicit, recommend, influence, or effect transactions in a security or commodity interest for any account, whether personal or firm, while in possession of material nonpublic information related to such interests," correct?

Doesn't talk about going to the general counsel.
A. Where are you reading this?
Q. Section 4 on page 10 .
A. Okay.
(The witness read.)
MR. KLOTZ: And you have to listen to his question because his question is: Did he read it correctly?

You may need to hear it back.

THE WITNESS: Please.
(The record was read back.)
A. Well, I've explained previous that I can think of instances when employees may transact for an account while in the possession of material nonpublic information and -- and so I stand on my testimony there.
Q. Okay. But that testimony is not entirely consistent with what $I$ just read to you, correct?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form,
A. I don't know if I agree with that.
Q. Why would you disagree with it?
A. Because my view is that this is a manual that -- that is a deterrent and -- and a code of conduct. In any code of conduct my view of conduct is what intention do we want -- what do we want our employees to do and act in particular situations? And my view is that's what conduct is.

And so because of the nature of the business we're in, you can't always get approval. You have to make a decision and judgment.

And -- now in the majority of cases when
you're in a situation like that, I would -- I would prefer and -- my -- it would be my strong preference. But I can think -- if you're asking absolutes, which is what you're asking, I can tell you situations where that may not be the case.
Q. Okay.

So it's not true that the -- the following restrictions must strictly adhered to.
A. No, it is true.
Q. So under no circumstances can someone trade on material nonpublic information.
A. See, we don't operate our firm in absolutes. So there are times when the intent of that -- of that paragraph is being -- and the conduct is being upheld by the person who is making the decision.
Q. Okay.

So where would I look for the intent? The language of this document?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. You know something? I -- you know, that I -- when we talk about conduct, you're talking about what people -- in your situation in your discussion, you're talking about what people would

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2 do with material nonpublic information and where -- and what should they do, what policies they should adhere to.

In my view -- let me put it a little different. If I can get 98, 99 percent compliance on -- and if they every once in a while there's a decision made because someone knows how to make that decision, to make it a hundred percent, I am really satisfied that the firm is conducting itself in appropriate way.
Q. So my question is simply: Does this have to be strictly adhered to or not?

MR. KLOTZ: Objection to the form.
A. And my answer to you is: As long as the intent is to adhere to the -- the policies and intent of how we want our employees to act, I believe that paragraph's been -- is being effected correctly.
Q. okay.

Well, if I looked at the paragraph for the intent, is it fair to say the intent is that employees would not solicit, recommend, influence, or effect transactions in a security or commodity interest for any account, whether personal or
firm, while in possession of material nonpublic information? Is that the intent?
A. Well, you know something? It's interesting because we just talked about over the last six --

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Excuse me. I think you knocked your microphone down. I can't hear you.

THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry. This thing
keeps falling off. Can you hear me now?
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Yeah.
A. We have talked about transactions that compliance and general counsel are very comfortable with where we were in possession of material -- potentially material nonpublic information, either rumor, and they acted totally appropriately.
Q. Are you done?
A. Yup.
Q. Okay.

My question was: The intent that you say is to be fulfilled, is the intent found in paragraph 4?
A. Well, you know, you and I have a
different point of view, that intent -- when I think of a code of conduct and I think of ethics, I think about intent, what we want our employees to act like. That's what in my mind a code of conduct and ethics is. Ethics is not something -it's -- that's a -- ethics are interpretation.

Your ethics may be totally different
than mine. So it reflects my compliance, my general counsel, my outside counsel, and my senior management's view on how people should act. And if someone is acting in that way, I believe they're adhering to this policy.
Q. Okay. And if I look to find out what it is you think -- how it is you think people should act, and I look at paragraph 4, it says, unequivocally that if I have material nonpublic information, I can't trade, right?
A. Well. --

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
You can go ahead and answer.
A. Well, we just discussed situations where they have.
Q. I understand there are certainly
situations where that's happened, sir. You've testified to that.

My question is: Is there anything in paragraph 4 that expresses any intent other than that you cannot trade while in possession of material nonpublic information?
A. See, the way -MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. The way I look at this is that you're taking one paragraph out of context. Okay? And that this is a guideline. Guidelines are always subject to interpretation.
Q. All right, sir. I go back to my question. I'm taking paragraph 4. Is there anything in paragraph 4 that expresses any intent other than not to trade while in possession of material nonpublic information?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. And my view is that I'm going to answer you again the same way, that you're taking this out of context, and I know what the intent of -of -- and because of my outside counsel and general and my -- my belief and judgment that they -- they provide sound policies that my firm
follows.
Q. Okay.

Are their policies reflected in paragraph 4?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I'm going to say it again. That taking a paragraph out of context, to me there are situations that people act, and while the vast majority of the times we expect them to -- to -to ask for guidance and advice from our compliance or counsel, there could be times when they act because they know and they've been in that situation before, and they know -- they've gone to counsel previous and they know what the response is.
Q. I understand that, sir. You've testified to that.

My question is: Is any of that outlined in paragraph 4?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. To me all these paragraphs are not absolutes. They're interpretations.
Q. Where in paragraph 4 is there any ambiguity as to the right of somebody to trade

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while in possession of material nonpublic information?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I'm going to say this again.

These are guidelines. There are no
absolutes in my business. Interpretation is important. And I can think of situations where someone would act -- and we've explained some today. I feel that they've made the -- an absolute right decision and they -- and while they may have chosen to go to counsel and go -- and go to compliance, they would be certainly showing good judgment in acting on -- on acting in those situations.
Q. okay.

Sir, I'll tell you what, you can keep giving me the same answer and I'm going to keep asking the same question.
A. Then we'll stay here the whole freaking night. I don't care.
Q. That's fine, sir.
A. Let's go.

MR. KLOTZ: We're only staying here till
6:00. We'll keep going until 6:00.
Q. Where in paragraph 4, sir, does it say anything other than that when in possession of material nonpublic information, you cannot trade?
A. I'm going to say it again.
Q. Go ahead.
A. These are guidelines. Every paragraph in this manual is a guideline.
Q. Where in paragraph 4, sir, does it say anything other than you cannot trade on material nonpublic information?
A. I don't look at these -- I don't look at this document paragraph by paragraph. These are guidelines I'm for behavior.
Q. Where in paragraph 4, sir, does it say anything other than you cannot trade on material nonpublic information -- you cannot trade while in possession of material nonpublic information?
A. I'm going to say it again.

I view this document as a series of paragraphs where it's a code of conduct and a code of ethics. There's always -- in any -- in any -there are all -- there are -- we've gone through situations where, if you were literal, but -- if you were literal, if you read that paragraph, if
you were literal -- but when my employees show sound judgment -- and understand the situation. My view is that -- my view is, you know, that they're doing the right thing and they're acting appropriately.
Q. Where in paragraph 4, sir, does it say anything other than literally you cannot trade while in possession of material nonpublic information?

THE WITNESS: May I have some water, please?

MR. KLOTZ: Sure. If you want to shorten your answer and just say "same answer," feel free to do that.
A. Yeah. Same answer.
Q. It's correct, is it not, sir -withdrawn.

I take it, sir, that if I keep asking you the same question, you'll continue to not answer it; is that right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I'll answer it every time.
Q. Okay.

You'll answer it the same way?
A. I'll answer it the same way.
Q. Okay.

Can you point to me to any language in paragraph 4 that provides for anything other than you not trading while in possession of material nonpublic information?
A. And I"m going to give you the same answer.
Q. So that is you cannot -- you can't point me to any such language?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I'm going to give you the same answer that $I$ did previous, that there are always times when -- and I've explained times in this deposition, where people -- as long as they show sound and good judgment, they can -- you know, they're following the -- the behavior and ethics rules that apply in this document.
Q. Okay.

So would you agree with me, sir, that paragraph 4 does not say, "Employees may not solicit, recommend, influence, or effect transactions in a security or commodity interest for any account, whether personal or firm, while
in possession of material nonpublic information related to such interest unless they're otherwise exercising sound judgment"?

Does it say that?
A. It does not say that.
Q. Okay.

It doesn't say any of the stuff that you just talked about in terms of what might happen and why, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I'll give you the same answer.
Q. That is, it doesn't say any of that.
A. Doesn't say what?
Q. It doesn't say that you can do anything, while in possession -- withdrawn.

Doesn't say that you have any judgment with respect to trading on -- while in possession of material nonpublic information, does it?
A. My view is that this manual is a -- is a code of behavior and ethics.
Q. I just want to know if paragraph 4 refers to judgment.
A. Say that again?
Q. Does paragraph 4 mention judgment?
A. Paragraph 4 literally doesn't mention judgment.
Q. Okay.

Does it implicitly mention judgment?
A. Out of context, it doesn't mention judgment.
Q. Okay.

Now, paragraph 11, it indicates on the second full paragraph, it is also the --
A. What page?
Q. Page 11.

Well, withdrawn for a second.
On page 11, under the bold, we talked about not communicating information to anyone else. But the second bullet point under the bold letters, all caps, indicates that you should not purchase or sell affected security or securities on behalf of the firm, the employee, or others if you may be in possession of material nonpublic information, right?

MR. KLOTZ: It literally says "if you believe that you may be."
Q. Right?
A. Can you restate your question?
Q. Sure.

It says, "Any employee who believes that
he or she may be in possession of material
nonpublic information should," bullet point 2 ,
"not purchase or sell the effected security or
securities on behalf of the firm, the employee, or others."

Do you see that?
A. I see that.
Q. Once again, that doesn't have any exception into it, does it?
A. Yeah, it does.
Q. Okay.

Where?
A. Right above it.
Q. Where is that?
A. "Report the matter immediately to the general counsel."

If a person has been in that situation before, then, the way $I$ read this is that he's got the experience to know how to act and act appropriately in a similar situation.
Q. Okay.

So your interpretation of this paragraph
with the three bullet points is that an employee who believes they're in possession of material nonpublic information could purchase or sell securities?
A. Yes. MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
Q. And they could do that under what circumstances?
A. Some of the circumstances that we discussed today.
Q. Okay. Even circumstances where they don't go to the general counsel.
A. If they've -- if they've been in that situation before and they understand how to act and follow the general intentions of -m of -- of what my general counsel, my compliance wants, yes.
Q. Okay.

Where does it say that in this
paragraph?
A. It says right here, "Report the matter immediately to the general counsel."
Q. Okay.

My question was, sometimes you don't
even have to go to the general counsel? And you said yes.

So I want to know where does it say
here --
A. It says right here that -- if the way that I interpret that is if the person has gone to the general counsel previous and understands how to act in a same situation and especially the way -- some of the things we discussed today, in my mind, he understands the intent and -- and desire of the firm and -- and understands what the general counsel is going to say.
Q. Okay.

So you interpret the words, "Report the matter immediately to the general counsel," as unless you've already talked to the general counsel about something similar?
A. In my mind --

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. In my mind there are certain procedures that are done in my business over and over and over again.

In those instances where the person understands and has been in that situation before
and general counsel has opined or compliance has opined that it's okay, then I think it's perfectly acceptable to act in those situations as long as the judgment is that this is a similar situation.
Q. Okay. So you would then say that you'd have to at some point in the past have gotten an opinion from general counsel that those particular circumstances would be okay.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. It would be my intent and desire that they understand and show good judgment. Part of that good judgment would be going to general counsel and affirming that this is an acceptable situation.
Q. But it's not required.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. It's my expectation that -- that they go to general counsel and compliance if they've never been involved in that situation before so they can understand how to act in that situation.
Q. And if they don't, can they trade?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. If they're making a judgment call in
their own hands and haven't discussed ever with compliance and/or general counsel, I could be uncomfortable with that.
Q. Okay.

What about the e-mails you saw concerning the Gwynn report and the Forbes report? Did anyone go to general counsel about those?
A. I have no idea.
Q. You're not aware of anyone going to general counsel.
A. I have no idea.
Q. You were on those e-mails. You didn't go to general counsel.
A. I don't remember the e-mails.
Q. You saw the e-mails last week, right?
A. I don't remember if we went to general counsel or if someone went to general counsel. I don't remember the e-mails.
Q. Okay.

You see the e-mails yesterday?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

Now, you don't have any recollection of anyone going to general counsel, right?
A. I personally have no knowledge.
Q. Okay. You didn't go to general counsel as far as you know.
A. I don't remember.
Q. As far as you know, you have no facts that indicate you went to general counsel.

MR. KLOTZ: Objection to the form.
A. I have no memory of going to general counsel or not.
Q. Okay.

Did you see any e-mails that indicated you went to general counsel?
A. I -- no.
Q. Did you see any e-mails where you told any of the people on the e-mails concerning the Gwynn report where you said, "Stop. Let's go to general counsel"?
A. I wasn't handling that particular situation. So, you know, it just wasn't something I was involved in.
Q. Okay.

But you're the head of the firm. It doesn't matter whether you're involved in it or not. You have an obligational interest --
A. Yeah, but do you know how many situations there are in a day?
Q. Let me finish my question, sir. You had the obligation as the head of the firm when you get an e-mail like that to act, do you not?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. If I'm not involved in the situation, I expect my employees to do the right thing. They're trained to do the right thing.
Q. So as the head of the firm, the head of that account -- they were trading in your account, right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay.

You get those e-mails. Your testimony
is you didn't have an obligation under the policy -- on your own policies to ensure that they had done what they needed to do to effect the trade?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. If I was aware of the e-mail and had any question about some of the issues that you're talking about, it's my policy -- it's my -- it's
my behavior to go to compliance or in-house counsel to get an answer.
Q. Okay.

Would you go or would you tell them to go?
A. I might tell them to go.
Q. Okay.

There's no e-mails where you did that, right?
A. None that I'm aware of.
Q. Okay.

You didn't see any responses to any of the several e-mails where they talked about the Gwynn report coming out or the Forbes report coming out where you said, "Hey, go run this by compliance"?
A. Say that again?
Q. You didn't see any e-mails in response to the several that you saw yesterday referencing the upcoming Gwynn report where you replied and said, "Hey, before you do anything, run this by general counsel"?
A. Because I wasn't involved in the situation, it wasn't a $--I$ don't remember the

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25 already been cleared by general counsel, right?
A. I have no idea what they've done. That's a supposition. I don't know if it's true or not true.
Q. Exactly.

From their e-mails, you have no idea whether they got approval from general counsel, right?
A. That is correct.
Q. And they don't send emmails to you about this upcoming report and say, "I've had this exact same situation in the past and general counsel said it was okay."

You haven't seen any messages like that, have you?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. Okay.

So at the time, as far as you know as the head of the firm, when you look at these e-mails, there's no indication that anyone has approved either this particular transaction for them or a similar transaction for them in the past, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. That $I$ have no idea. Could be true. I
don't know.
Q. I didn't ask you whether it was true. I asked you from the e-mails that you've seen that you've received, there is no indication that anyone from compliance or legal has okayed continuing transactions while they were in possession of that information about the Gwynn report or previously told them that type of transaction would be okay. There's nothing in an e-mail that indicates that, right?
A. I have not personally seen one.
Q. Okay.

No one has shown you one, right?
A. No one has shown me one.
Q. And you're not aware of one, right?
A. I am not aware of one.
Q. Okay.

So given the complete lack of evidence
that either continuing to transact in that security had been approved by the general counsel or had previously been approved by the general counsel, is it still your testimony that it was okay for them to continue to transact in that security?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Okay. And you say that's consistent with the policy manual.
A. It's consistent with my intent.
Q. Okay. But you weren't the one trading, sir. You said you weren't even involved, right?
A. Yeah. But you're asking me -- what's your question?
Q. Okay.

You're saying it's consistent with your intent as to how you want your employees to act; is that right?
A. My employees did everything appropriate.
Q. Okay.

My question is: When you said,
"consistent with my intent," you meant that behavior, continuing to trade in that, even though they didn't have approval of general counsel, didn't have any indication general counsel that it would be okay, was consistent with your intent, right?
A. It's my belief that what they did was totally appropriate.
Q. I'm asking you, when you said, "consistent with my intent" -- I just want to make sure I understand what you're saying.

Contrary to the policy manual, you said it's your intent that it was okay for them to continue trading in those transactions even though they had not cleared it with the general counsel or ever indicated that they had heard from the general counsel that such transactions were okay. MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Okay. It's my belief that the people involved trading this were experienced portfolio managers.

This wasn't a very complicated situation. It's actually a very simple situation. Buying stock, either thinking, by rumor -- and I don't know the facts. I don't know what really was true or not true. In either case, it's sort of a nonevent because they were on the other side of the transaction, and, therefore, because of my explanations previous, they conducted themselves totally above board and did the right thing.
Q. Did anyone show you that Mr. Pohly had shorted securities on the same day he sent the
e-mail about the Forbes story coming out and the Gwynn report coming out?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form. Among other things, Pohly sent no such e-mail.

But go ahead and answer on the
hypothetical that he's given you.
A. No. The transaction that you're talking about, when was that -- when was that taking place?
Q. On January 9.
A. 2003?
Q. Yeah.
A. I'm not aware of that transaction.
Q. So when you say it would be okay for members of your firm -- of your group back then to buy, knowing that a report is going to come out that's going to drive the price down, do you have the same answer if they are selling and shorting?
A. It really comes down to where they heard that. If they heard a rumor, I think it would be totally appropriate.
Q. If they heard it from the reporter that he was coming out with a negative story --
A. I wasn't -- I wasn't on that phone call.

So that's a supposition. I have no idea what was in that conversation.
Q. What if they sent you an e-mail that said the reporter told me he is coming out with a negative story? It is it your testimony it would be okay for them to short?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. If the story was not coming out in a relatively short period of time, I would say there was ambiguity on that. I think it might be okay.
Q. What if it was coming out in the next few days?
A. That $I$ don't know -- I mean, if they knew that, I would -- I would say -- trying to think of -- if the reporter told them that they're coming out with a negative story -- that's what you're saying?
Q. Yup.
A. Now, is that a hypothetical or is that true?
Q. Doesn't matter, sir.

What's the answer to the question?
A. I think the answer is $I$ would want them not to trade on that.
harming anyone. I think that was your language. You've talked at length.

How does that impact on putting a stock on the restricted list?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
MS. BARNHOUSE: Objection. Form.
A. I mean, it's common procedure in the firm for employees to ask to put a stock on the restricted list.
Q. Under what circumstances?
A. When they -- when they -- when they believe they're in possession of material nonpublic information.
Q. How long has that been the policy?
A. Since I've been in business.
Q. Okay.

Is there anything in this policy manual
that I have from 2002 that talks about that?
MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I -- it could be in here. I -- I know that's the policy.
Q. Okay.

Is -- is -- it's not in the sections that I've handed you as an exhibit.

Is there some other portion of this manual that hasn't been produced where it talks about putting things on the restricted list?
A. I haven't reviewed the whole document, so I --
Q. I'll tell you what. Take a second and go through as much as you want. Maybe I'm missing it. Let me know, the document that was produced, does it outline when things are going to be put on the restricted list, when you're supposed to ask to be put on the restricted list, and look at the table of contents to --
A. So what's your point?
Q. I have a question, not a point, sir.
A. What's your question?
Q. My question is: Does that exhibit talk about what you just described as a procedure to put things on a restricted list?
A. I don't see anything here about a restricted list.
Q. Okay.

But it was your policy back in '02 and '03 that if an employee came into possession of material nonpublic information, they were supposed
to request that it be put on a restricted list?
A. No. What I would expect them is to talk to general counsel and discuss whether it should be on the restricted list.
Q. Okay.

And when would it -- when should it be put on the restricted list?
A. When -- I mean, they're either in possession of material nonpublic information or they're -- they're -- they want to transact in a way that's -- in the -- in their -- whatever material nonpublic information they have, if they want to transact in the direction of what that material nonpublic information -- the way I think -- the way it should work is that the person would go to counsel and explain the situation. It would be my hope that in that conversation they come to the conclusion whether it should be on the restricted list or not, unless -- unless -- now there's always situations where, you know, nothing's a hundred percent. And in this situation where -- where employees, portfolio managers are buying stock in front and they have the experience and the good
judgment to know that it's acceptable, then I don't have a problem with that.
Q. But what's the point of having a restricted list if you're just going to rely on the portfolio managers to trade in the right direction as you believe they're entitled to do?
A. Well, it's a judgment call. I mean, there are times when -- in every -- in situations where employees make judgments calls. If they're unsure about how to handle the situation, they better go to compliance or general counsel.

If they have the experience and they know and they've been in the situation before, it wouldn"t be an automatic.
Q. Okay.

So because it's not in here, I haven't had a chance to go through the rules on when something gets on a restricted list, how it gets on there, what it means when it gets on there.

So let me explore that a little bit with you.

Okay.
Back in '02 and '03, what was the criteria for putting a stock on the restricted
A. I don't remember.
Q. What was the criteria today for putting it on the restricted list?
A. I mean --

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. It would be, you know, if you're in possession of material nonpublic information and if you're unsure, you would go to counsel. It's not an automatic.
Q. Unsure about what?
A. Unsure whether the stock should be restricted or not. You would go -- you would -you would go to counsel to ask, unless you have been in that situation before and you would make the call.
Q. Okay.

If -- you started your answer by saying it would go on the restricted list if you were in possession of material nonpublic information, unless you were unsure.

Unless you were unsure about that?
A. Whether it should be on a restricted list or not.
Q. Okay.

Does all material nonpublic information warrant being put on the restricted list?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. We've talked about situations today where actually it's not case.
Q. Are you referring to the situations where you're going to trade in the opposite direction?
A. Or you're going to trade in the opposite direction.
Q. Okay.

But isn't the point of the restricted list -- let me withdraw that.

When something gets put on the restricted list, what is the impact of that?
A. The impact of that is the firm cannot trade in those securities.
Q. In any direction?
A. In any direction.
Q. Anyone?
A. Anyone.
Q. So there's no qualification in the restricted list on what direction you're trading,

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right?
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MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Well, you know, if you object to that, you could easily go to counsel and you could have it taken off restricted, if he agrees, within five minutes.
Q. Okay.

Why -- why do you put it -- why is there a resisted list? Why can't a portfolio manager just say, "I'm not going to trade it"? Why is it put on a restricted list?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Because he's one portfolio manager, and I have 60 portfolio managers.
Q. What if they don't know?
A. That's not the way we want to operate.
Q. All right.

So your point is when the firm is in possession of that material nonpublic information, the firm possesses it, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I'm not totally sure about that answer.
Q. Okay.

So why then can't it just stay in the
brain of the one portfolio manager? Why does it have to be put on the restricted list?
A. Because that's the way we do business.
Q. Is that the way you did business in 2002?
A. That's the way I hope we did business.
Q. 2003?
A. I would assume so.
Q. Okay. And the reason that's important, is it not, because you can't guarantee once someone's in possession of that information that they're not going to go out and execute it in the direction that you would say is inappropriate, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Well, I mean, mistakes can be made. I mean, people, you know, if the firm's in -- in -but I'm not entirely sure.-- I mean, there could be situations where certain people know and other people don't and it might be okay, but I'm not a hundred percent sure. I think these are legal questions that I would go to my counsel to ask.
Q. Okay.

So based on your 30 years of experience
and the many years you've run S.A.C., you don't know the answer to that question?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Because it's complex.
Q. Now, what was to prevent -- withdrawn. When you say everyone acted appropriately with respect to the trading in ' 03 at or around the time of the Gwynn report, you're looking at that from after the fact of the trading, right?
A. Well, I don't remember trading.
Q. Okay.
A. So looking at -- looking at documents at -- you know, over the last week or two.
Q. And that doesn't tell you -- withdrawn.

It could just as easily have been that,
in retrospect, they shorted the stock and that would have been inappropriate, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. In that -- in this situation --
Q. Uh-huh.
A. -- with the facts that you're presenting, if they shorted the stock knowing that report was coming out, I would find that
inappropriate.
Q. Okay. And, of course, at the time - - at the -- at that time you had no way of knowing whether all the recipients on those e-mails that expressed the expectation of that report coming out were going to trade in any particular way, did you?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I am -- I -- I could have an expectation depending on what the positions of the firm was. It's possible.
Q. Okay. But you don't know who else in the firm they're telling that to, right? MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Who's telling that to?
Q. The people who -- there are e-mails that indicate to you that there were people in your group who had an expectation that a -- a report from Morgan Keegan was coming out and that a Forbes story was coming out.

You've seen those e-mails, right?
A. If you understand it correctly, the Forbes story were -- were -- were -- the way I understand it, that was Rob Pohly and, I think,

Glenn Shapiro. They were not in my group.
Q. Okay.

Did they communicate to your group?
A. I believe there was an e-mail, but I'm not sure if it came to my group.
Q. Okay. So why were they communicating that to your group?
A. Because, in general, it wouldn't surprise me that portfolio -- other portfolio -because I run the main account and the people in my account are helping me in that main account, that it -- it would not surprise me to have other portfolio managers sending me their thoughts on particular stocks.
Q. Okay. You raise a good question. The Cohen account at that point in time -- in the e-mails we got, it just says "Cohen account."
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Who else is -- who else is in that group chain at that time?
A. I mean, I -- I can't remember who was in the account at that time. I do know that around
that time in the stock, there was Evan Behrens, there was Jeff Perry, but I"m not really sure who was in the account. We move people around a lot.
Q. Well, give me an idea how many portfolio managers there would have been in your account at that time?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Usually, I sectorize the account, and so there could easily be different people running different parts of the account.
Q. I just wanted to know how many.
A. It really various.
Q. Dozens?
A. Analysts and portfolio managers or just portfolio?
Q. Let's just talk about people who can put out trades.
A. I would say no more than 10 , maybe 15, max, depending on the year.
Q. And that would include everyone in the Cohen account?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
You mean just portfolio managers?
MR. BOWE: Uh-huh.

MR. KLOTZ: So the question is: Does the ten to 15 include every portfolio manager in the Cohen account?
A. It depends on the year. I can -- I think in 2000. Later on there might have been more who could have put on trades.
Q. Okay.

And the reason I ask that question wasn't clear was: You had said you -- I think you said you sectorized it.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. I've seen "Cohen internal." I've seen "Cohen financials." I've seen -- I'm just trying -- and I've seen "Cohen account."

How do those differ?
A. Well, Cohen financial, I think, is self-explanatory. It's the -- the set -- the -it's the financial section of the Cohen account. Cohen internal, I don't know what that is.
Q. When you say the Cohen financial is self-explanatory, I apologize, but what do you mean by that?
A. I said the Cohen financial is -- you say

Cohen financial or Cohen internal?
Q. I said Cohen -- Cohen internal, you said you don't know what that is.
A. Right.
Q. Cohen financial you said is self-explanatory. That's the financial section of the Cohen account. So financial is financial.

So just bear with me. What is in that banks and insurance companies?
A. I would say banks, insurance companies, any security that -- that would be involved with the financial system or, you know, financial technology or something related to financials.
Q. Okay.

And is every one of the ones in the Cohen account an account that -- that's your account?
A. That's my account.

MR. BOWE: Now, okay, we have to change the tape. So let's take a break.

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record. The time is 5:03 p.m. This is the end of Tape Number 4.
(A recess was taken.)

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are back on the record. The time is 5:18 p.m. This is the beginning of Tape Number 5 .
Q. Mr. Cohen, at the break did you talk to counsel about your testimony?
A. Once again, I asked how I was doing.
Q. Okay.

Did you look at any documents?
A. No.
Q. Did you look at any documents at any breaks that we've had?
A. No.
Q. Now, one of the reasons why you have a requirement that if someone comes into possession of nonpublic -- material nonpublic information, they not tell anyone else and they notify the general counsel is to ensure that other people in the firm don't trade on it, right?
A. Yes. I think that's correct.
Q. Okay.

Now, isn't another reason why you have a restricted list is because your firm understands that it is against $S E C$ rules to trade, period, while in possession of material nonpublic
information?
MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I think we've been through this all day today that each case in -- if you want to talk in absolutes, you know, the reality is that each -each case is slightly different.

And I've talked about situations where I think it would be perfectly appropriate to -- to not restrict the stock and allow someone to trade on it.
Q. Okay.

I thought what went on a restricted list is when you were in possession of material nonpublic information.
A. When -- I mean, it might -- it might go on a restricted list. I mean, most of the time it probably would. I would say more times than not, but I -- you know, once again, this is a judgment call and either the portfolio manager will make that judgment call based on his experiences in similar situations or he will go to counsel and counsel together with the portfolio manager will discuss it, maybe even with compliance, and come up with a decision whether it should be on the
restricted list or, you know, allowing anybody to trade -- trade or transact in it.
Q. Okay.

What I'm trying to do -- I know you've testified, but we haven't testified about it in the context of the restricted list, which I don't really understand the purpose of the restricted list in light of what you've testified about, and that's what I'm trying to understand.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. If -- if it's permitted for a portfolio -- if -- withdrawn.

If the restricted list's purpose is to make sure that while the firm is in possession of material nonpublic information, no one in the firm is trading in that security at least in a direction of that information, as you put it, how is that served by allowing one portfolio manager in his judgment to decide not to put it on the restricted list because he's going to trade in the opposite direction?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Well, once again, $I$ think, you know, in general, I can think of many instances when, in

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possession of material nonpublic information, you would immediately restrict yourself.
Q. Give me some examples.
A. The CEO of a company tells you that he's taking over XYZ tomorrow. I would expect that to be on the restricted list.
Q. Any other examples?
A. Somebody in a -- in a public company tells you that what they're earnings are going to be when they report in two weeks. I would want that immediately restricted.
Q. Why?
A. Because that person is in possession of material nonpublic information and, essentially, the company brought him over the wall, and I would expect that to be restricted.
Q. Why couldn't you just ignore it and trade in the opposite direction?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. See, I think those are judgment calls and, to me, it's highly, highly unlikely that someone would go on the other direction and -- and a analyst sell recommendation, while potentially market moving, in my mind doesn't rise to the same
severity as -- or importance as knowing the quarterly earnings given to you by a person at another company.
Q. Well, that really depends on what the earnings are going to be and what the report's going to say, right?
A. Well, I think these are two totally different situations, and I think you're confusing the two.
Q. How am I confusing the two?
A. Because I just said that $I$ can't think of any reason why -- in possession of knowing the earnings of a company that's been given to you by a company insider where I wouldn't restrict the stock.
Q. And is that because you think that all such information would always move the market?
A. I wouldn't want to be in a position to make that judgment call.
Q. Why not?
A. Because I think that -- that's too tough a call to make.
Q. Okay.

Now, an analyst report can also move the
market, right?
A. Theoretically.
Q. In fact, the John Gwynn's initial report moved the market dramatically, did it not?
A. I don't remember how much it moved.
Q. But you know it moved dramatically, don't you?
A. I was told.
Q. Okay.

And more dramatically than many earnings releases by companies, right?

MS. BARNHOUSE: Objection. Form.
A. Because I don't know, you know, how much it moved, I can't answer that.
Q. Well, lots of earnings releases by companies don't move the stock very much at all, right?
A. That's true.
Q. If they're on -- if they're consistent with street expectations, you don't see very much movement, right?
A. Potentially, yes.
Q. Okay. So is it your testimony that whether
something ends up on the restricted list or not is sort of subject to all the same questions of judgment that determine whether or not someone has to tell the general counsel or can on their own trade in the security?
A. I mean, I -MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I've testified that in the vast majority of cases you would probably have to go to compliance or general counsel to opine on whether you can trade on it.

But I can think of situations where -because they've been in the situation before -but they have to show good judgment.
Q. Can you think of instances where you came into possession of information that potentially was material or nompublic and you didn't put it on the restricted list?
A. I'm always running into the compliance and legal departments. So I can't think of any off the top of my head, but I'm sure there are instances.
Q. Okay.

You're sure there are instances where
you are in possession of material nonpublic information and you don't put it on the restricted list.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I can't think of any off the top of my head.
Q. In September 2008, did you learn that the Fed was going to back stop commercial paper?
A. I -- I don't even remember that.
Q. Do you remember being told that the Fed was going to announce that it was going to back stop commercial paper before that announcement was made?
A. I don't remember that.
Q. Do you know anything called the Commercial Paper Funding Facility?
A. Vaguely.
Q. And you remember that was the Fed coming in to back stop the purchase and transfer of commercial paper?
A. I'm not a credit person. So I'm not sure what that is.
Q. Was a person named Mark Tishfield a credit person at that time?
Q. Mr. Cohen, you said that you knew Rob Pohly was an experienced portfolio manager.
A. That's correct.
Q. What did you mean by that when you said it?
A. He was -- he was one of my better portfolio managers and a very responsible individual.
Q. And how long had he been at your firm?
A. I don't remember. I mean, I don't know when he arrived at my firm.
Q. Okay.

At the time that you were trading in Fairfax securities at the end of 2002 and beginning of 2003, how long about had he been at your firm?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Had he been there years?
A. I -- I couldn't give you an exact date. My guess is he showed up 2000, 1999, 2001?
Q. And when did he leave?
A. He left a -- he -- maybe three to five years ago.
Q. Okay.

Why did he leave?
A. Because he wanted to set up his own firm.
Q. Okay.

Did he set up his own firm?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. Did you invest in that firm?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. Okay.

So at the time of late 2002, beginning of 2003, would it be fair to say Mr. Pohly was familiar with the policies and procedures at S.A.C.?
A. I can't speak for -- I can't speak for Rob Pohly.
Q. Well, did you supervise him?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I don't believe $I$ was his supervisor.
Q. Do you think he understood your intention with respect to when trading could and couldn't be done?
A. I believed he was a very smart and person of high integrity and, therefore, I think he would -- my opinion is he would act very

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appropriately.
Q. Okay.

But my question was a little bit
different. My question was: You've talked quite a bit today about the compliance manual says one thing but that it needs to be understood in context, and in the context of sort of what your intent was.

And my question is: would you -- would it be your expectation that Mr. Pohly, based on the amount of time he had spent at the firm by late 2002, early 2003, understood what your intention was with respect to when people could trade and when they couldn't trade in securities?
A. I -- I have a high regard for Rob Pohly. He's an outstanding individual and a very ethical and conducts himself always in an proper way. So the answer is yes.
Q. Okay.

Well, he might be an upstanding individual and have absolutely no idea about what you intended for trading.

So my question is: Did he -- was it your understanding, based on your view, that by

2003 Mr . Pohly had a good understanding of sort of what trading was okay by you and what wasn't okay by you?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. We had our -- we had our policies. We had training. Rob was on outstanding individual, came from a very good firm. I don't remember ever Rob not handling himself in the appropriate way, and so, you know, my view is he would be operating and -- with -- with the intent that I had of how I wanted the firm run.
Q. Okay.

And you would understand that he would have an good understanding of how you wanted the firm run by 2003, right?
A. I believe that.
Q. Okay.

Now, Mr. Pohly was never disciplined by S.A.C., was he?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Okay.

Was he ever -- was he ever reprimanded or given additional instruction for any reason relating to his trading?
A. None that I'm aware of.
Q. What about Glenn Shapiro?
A. Glenn Shapiro, just a very proper. straightforward, great analyst.
Q. Did he also, you think, by 2003 have a solid understanding of what you believed was appropriate and inappropriate behavior with respect to trading at S.A.C.?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. My belief is Glenn was a very cautious individual, was part of that team that operated in a very outstanding way, and I have a high regard for him.
Q. I didn't ask whether you had a high regard for him.

What I asked was whether you thought by 2003 he had a solid understanding of what you believed was appropriate/inappropriate behavior with respect to trading at S.A.C.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Well, my memory doesn't serve me back eight years on Glenn Shapiro at 2003. My experiences with him, in general, was that this was a person who did things by the book.
Q. When you say "by the book," you mean by the written policy manual or by what you've described outside the manual?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. What $I$ described as really my intent, how I want my employees to operate.
Q. Okay.

And how long had he been at the firm by 2003?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Had he been there years?
A. I have no idea. I mean, he's working for a guy who probably came between 1999 and, say, 2001. He wasn't there before that.
Q. What about Andy Cohen?
A. Just he's a very good guy.
Q. Now, did Andy Cohen -- how long had he been at your firm in 2003?
A. My guess is two to three years, maybe -no, actually, maybe longer. It could have been four or five.
Q. Okay.

And what was his position?
A. When?
Q. 2003, beginning of 2003 .
A. I believe he was working for the Cohen account.
Q. Okay. In what capacity? Portfolio manager, analyst?
A. Analyst.
Q. Okay.

Now, do you think at that point in time he had a solid understanding as to what your intent -- Mr. Cohen's intent with respect to when it was appropriate and inappropriate to trade in securities at S.A.C.?
A. I think Andy was a very cautious analyst. As an analyst, he didn't -- he didn't actually transact. All he did was do the -- the work.
Q. Okay.

But he would have been under the same obligation as any every other employee there to raise any issues that he believed might run afoul of the policies at S.A.C. concerning trading, right?
A. If he was aware of them.
Q. And so my question isn't whether he was

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cautious or friendly or anything.
What I want to know is: By 2003 did he have a handle as to what you believe was appropriate and inappropriate for trading at S.A.C.?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I think so.

Andy's very smart individual, very cautious individual, and -- and a person of high integrity.
Q. Okay.

Whether he's cautious, whether he has high integrity, I understand that.

I want to know whether he understood the types of things you were describing earlier as the context in which you needed to understand --
A. I believe that.
Q. Okay.

So he wouldn't do anything or watch
anything that he didn't understand you thought was okay.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. It's my belief that Andy -- I've known Andy for a long time and -- I think he operates in
a very -- with high integrity and -- and I think he's a -- a good, able, smart, and operates and knows how to operate within the context of what I want.
Q. Okay.

What was the address for -- withdrawn. Can you tell me anyone else who was in the Cohen account in January 2003?
A. Well, I found out, I think, yesterday -I mean, we met twice, so -- you know, it was yesterday -- might have been a week ago -- that Larry Sapanski was in the account, that Forrest Fontana was in the account.
Q. Anyone else you remember?
A. There were other people. It's not coming to my mind right now.
Q. Okay. Who was in the group "trading financial services"?
A. That would have been Larry Sapanski and Forrest Fontana.
Q. Okay.

Is that separate than the Cohen account?
A. I believe they were still in the Cohen
account.
Q. They were in two different accounts?
A. No. I think if they were in the Cohen account, it might have had a portfolio within the account, but it's still part of the -- the overall Cohen account.
Q. Okay. So "trading - financial," I understood you said you had Cohen account, financial. I understood that.

Did you have a Cohen account trading? Was there a different address for other people who were in trading?
A. No. It was -- it was broken up by sectors.
Q. Okay.

What about Mr. Sapanski? How long had he been there by January 2003?
A. My guess he was probably there five to seven years.
Q. Okay.

And what was his position? Portfolio

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manager?
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A. Portfolio manager.
Q. So certainly had a view -- a solid
understanding of what you thought was appropriate and inappropriate for trading at S.A.C., right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. I've always felt Larry conducted himself, and I had a lot of faith in his ability and his judgment.
Q. Okay.

I didn't ask your views as to how he conducted himself or whether you had faith in him.

My question is whether or not you believed in 2003 he had a solid understanding of what you would and wouldn't approve of in terms of trading.

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And is the same for Mr. Fontana?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Yes, I do.
Q. How long had Mr. Fontana been there?
A. I would guess, I -- I don't remember. Two, three years. But I thought he was a very solid analyst.
Q. Okay.

Did he also by that point in time have, 24 Sapanski in running the financial account.
in your view, a solid understanding of what you would have viewed as appropriate and inappropriate trading?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Operating in proximity of me, I would expect that.
Q. What do you mean?
A. He's in my account.
Q. When you say -- well, when you say operating in proximity, do you mean he's in your account or he sits next to you on the floor?
A. You know, the -- my people in my account, the portfolio managers, all sat fairly close to each other. The analysts would always come and talk to the portfolio managers.
Q. And so based on -- you meant in proximity, meaning he's physically near you?
A. He would be -- in meetings, he would -he would hear me, every -- you know, if he came by the account, if he -- he might have been doing work in his office, but he was certainly someone who I thought did a very good job with Larry
Q. Okay.

19 has high integrity?
A. I think so. 2003?
A. I don't remember.

And so Mr. Fontana, based on his exposure to you in meetings and in -- with respect to trading and everything, he would have had a solid understanding at the time in '03, beginning of '03, as to what type of trading activity you thought was appropriate and inappropriate, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
A. Assuming he was there for enough time. I would say if he was only there a few months, you know, maybe -- you know, he would -- he would certainly being trained in what we want.

But I -- since I don't remember how many years, but he was certainly a good analyst and an upstanding -- in fact, I think he was a selectman up in Massachusetts. So certainly someone who I think demonstrates high integrity.
Q. Because he's a selectman, you think he
Q. Well, how long had he been there by
Q. How long did he stay with S.A.C.?
A. He became a portfolio manager and then
he left maybe two to four years later.
Q. Okay.

How long had he been at S.A.C. before he was a portfolio manager?
A. I can't -- I don't know the answer to that.
Q. Would that have been longer than months?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Would it have been like at least a year?
A. Probably.
Q. Okay.

Because the e-mails we have from '03
list him as a portfolio manager. Would that indicate that he had been there for more than a year?
A. I'm not sure. Since I haven't seen the e-mails, I really don't know how to answer that. He had a portfolio. I don't remember if he was running the financials with Larry or Larry was in charge of it. That I'm not clear on.
Q. Okay. But his title on January 9, 2003, according to his e-mail, is portfolio manager.
A. Okay.

I can't respond to that because I -- you know, I haven't seen the e-mail. If that's the case, then he must have been a portfolio manager.
Q. Okay.

If he had been a portfolio manager, he would have been there for at least a year?
A. I don't know the answer to that.
Q. He didn't come in as a portfolio manager, did he?
A. I believe he came in as an analyst.
Q. Okay.

And he worked with Mr. Sapanski?
A. I believe he came in to work with Sapanski, but he might have come in as a portfolio manager. I know they worked together at some point. I just don't remember what was what. MR. KLOTZ: I'm out of time. MR. BOWE: Okey-doke. THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the record. The time is 5:56 p.m. This is the end of Tape Number 5.
(Time noted: 5:56 P.M.)

1 talks about, among other things, going out to meet 2 with various journalists and media sources to basically introduce you to them.

Do you recall that recommendation from Sard?

A That would be something that I'm sure they recommended me to do.

Q Okay. And one of the reasons outlined in that memo for doing so is to dispel "certain myths" about you. Do you recall that being a topic of discussion with your media people?

A Absolutely.
Q Okay. What myths were you attempting to dispel by going out and meeting journalists and media people?

A Well, just that the press was making statements that I was reclusive, secretive; and we just felt that it was wrong.

Q Well, there were also -- also rumors and myths, if you will, as your media people characterize them, about your firm engaging in inappropriate conduct, right?

A Well, I don't know. That's a speculative question. I don't know what's going through journalists' heads. Other than -- it was
important, I think, for journalists to meet me.
Q Okay. But my question was, were the myths, as you described them, that you were concerned about addressing, rumors and views in the marketplace that potentially you had engaged in improper conduct?

A The answer is, you know, I suspect people -- there are rumors and what we wanted to do was dispel any notion of that.

Q What rumors?
A The rumors you just stated, that people weren't sure how we conducted our business.

Q Okay. And you then give -- as part of that process ultimately you gave an interview with Vanity Fair, right?

A That's correct.
Q And in that story, the author talks about, although he doesn't quote you, but he indicates that you had -- you were weary of being dogged of allegations about insider trading for years; is that true?

A Well, that was his opindon.
Q Well, is that true, though? Is that something that you've had to deal with for years? MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.

THE WITNESS: I mean, I think the answer to that is, I've become pretty desensitized to, you know, that type of talk. BY MR. BOWE:

Q But that was the type of talk that you had to deal with over the years; is that right?

A It's the talk that, you know, whether I had to deal with it or not, you know, that's certainly other people's opinions or some people's opinions, and I accept it for what it is.

Q So you were aware of those?
A I certainly was aware of it.
Q Okay. And you also complained in that story about being linked to a whole series of articles that started to appear in the fall of " 09 about the FBI and the Department of Justice investigations into insider trader.

Do you recall that, telling the reporter that?

A I don't recall exactly what was said in the article about that.

Q You recall expressing to him that you were upset that your name had been linked in many of the stories talking about the Department of Justice arrests and investigation in '09 and 2010 into

Q Now, how long had that story -- how long had people who were involved at S.A.C. been working with the New York Times story before it came out?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: I have no idea.
BY MR. BOWE:
Q Now, the story indicates that, in the context of talking about why it was a relentlessly competitive environment, the point that's then drawn from that is that because it's so competitive there's little incentive for the people who are working there to cooperate with each other. You would disagree with that, right?

A I would disagree with that strongly.
Q And so any indication in the story that there was a disincentive for people to share information at S.A.C. you would disagree with?

A The answer is people have the right, if they've done analysis on something, they don't have to share it with other people in the firm, but they do have to share it with my account or my sector heads.

Q Okay. That was going to be my next area, but before $I$ get there, it also repeats sort
of the oft-repeated characterization of S.A.C. as an eat what you kill type of place.

You've heard that before, right?
A I've heard it, but I'm not responsible for people's quotes or what they say about it.

Q Okay. And what do you understand that to refer to?

A Well, it means that people, the way I understand it, is that if whatever $P \& L$ they generate, they get paid on it. And not relevant to what other people are doing.

Q Right. And is that a correct understanding of how S.A.C. works?

A I think, you know, I think it's a harsh statement on just people getting paid incentives. I get paid incentives as a hedge fund manager and I pay my people incentives. So actually it's very consistent with how the hedge fund industry actually works.

Q Okay. But if somebody -- people there, their compensation is gauged predominantly on whether or not they have brought in profits or not, right?

A That's where probably the majority of their incentives -- incentive fees -- they would get

1 paid based on their own profits and in addition they 2 could get paid based on upsizing -- upstreaming 3 ideas to the, either main account or to the sector 4 head accounts where they would get tagged on 5 potential ideas.

## produce?

A That is correct.
Q And then if you produce, you can get more money to manage and produce even more and make more money?

A It's conceivable, but it really depends on the other characteristics of the portfolio. They're running the volatility of their portfolios, sort of their -- the space that they're in, how much risk do we want to take --

Q Right.
A -- as a firm.
Q But the typical career path, the idea that someone is how they're going to advance is
that, and typically based on our risk limits it would be highly improbable that that could happen in that short period of time.

Q Okay. Now, when Mr. Shapiro was testifying about trading he indicated that there's also limits on concentration that they could put on in their position; is that true?

A That's correct.
Q All right. Explain to me what that means.

A What that is, is they can only be a certain amount of their capital in any one stock.

Q Okay. And is there a typical limit that's --

A It's usually 10 percent of buying power.

Q Okay. And is there a limit at the firm level?
A. No.

Q So how do you figure out or gauge whether or not across all the portfolios whether you end up being too concentrated in a particular stock?

A We measure the positions versus the average liquidity in a name on a particular day, and we like to keep it within a certain range of

1 liquidity. Now, these are rules that we have put 2 in, you know, have evolved over the last, you know, 3 three, four, five years.

Q Okay. Would these rules have been in place in 2005, 2006?

A They would have been different rules then.

Q Okay. How so?
A The limits were a little bit larger.
Q Okay. So what were the range of limits back in '05 and '06?

A It could have been -- instead of being -- allowing a portfolio manager to be 20 percent at long or short, it could have been 40,50 percent in that long or short.

Q Okay. So if Mr. Shapiro said that if somebody got to 10 percent, you would never stand for that; that wouldn't apply back in 105 and 06 ?

A It probably -- the limits were a little looser then.
$Q \quad$ You mentioned -- so people who worked there can be compensated based on the profit in their own portfolio, whatever amount of money you've given them to manage, then you also mentioned that they have an obligation to pass up to your account

1 their work product and their ideas. Did I
2 understand that correctly?

A The way it really works is that they write -- they write a portfolio review every two weeks and then they're obligated to pass some of their ideas up to us.
$Q$ Okay. And they're obligated to pass up, what, their two best longs and their two best shorts?

A It could be. Or it could be something they're working on, some new idea, maybe maintenance on an existing idea.

Q And you described that to investors as a hub and spoke strategy, right?

A That is the term we use, yes.
Q And you describe to investors who are potentially going to give you money the fact that you have -- you personally, the Cohen account, only manages, I think, 15 percent of the fund today?

A That is correct.
Q How much was it in ' 05 and '06?
A I don't have the percentage. It was probably 25 percent.

Q But although you don't manage -- say at that time you didn't manage 75 percent of the fund,

1 one of the attractions, one of the things you pitched to investors was that through this hub and spoke model, ideas were required to be passed up to your account and therefore good ideas could be leveraged across the entire fund, right?

A That is correct.
Q So when -- how are the ideas passed -well, first of all, how is it that people understand they're supposed to do this?

A That's an expectation when they come into the firm.

Q Okay. I looked at some of your marketing materials and it says to investors that this is a requirement.

Is it described to them as a
requirement?
A The answer is, it's -- I call it an expectation, because a requirement means it has to be fulfilled. And we're probably a little bit looser, depending on the individual and depending on my -- if it's a space I care about or not.

Q Okay. And what do you mean by a space you care about or not?

A Well, there are certain spaces that just don't interest me that much.

Q Okay. Like what?
A
It could be, at that time it could have been -- it could have been insurance.

It could have been anything. Do you
remember in '05, '06?
A I don't, but, I mean, typically, I probably did less in financials than $I$ would in, say, retail or energy.

Q But you had groups at S.A.C. who focused on financials, right?

A That is correct.
Q And they gave you their ideas, did they not?

A They -- they wrote their portfolio reviews, and if I asked for ideas, they would send them.

Q Okay. And you actually had in the Cohen group people who did financials, right?

A At some point, yes. At some point I did. But I wouldn't say consistently throughout the period.

Q Okay. Now, what is the incentive for somebody who sends something upstream, as you said, an idea?

A Well, first, he's being a team player,

1 which matters to us. Second, he can get paid on the 2 idea. And so he certainly has an incentive to, you 3 know, if the idea works, he certainly can make more 4 money. And, you know; and three, we ask and then we 5 expect people to do it. he know whether he's going to get -- you say it's an incentive for him, so presumably if you adopt the idea and it does well, he gets -- do they understand a particular amount they're going to get or it's just they"ll get something? How does that work?

A It's evolved over the years, and today it's probably 4 percent of what the profit on a particular position, maybe offset by hedges.

Q Okay. What would it have been in '05 and '06?

A I don't remember. It could have been the same, I just -- it's a policy that's evolved.

Q Okay. And how do you keep track of that?

A Typically, in '05, '06, it would have been somebody assigned that role in my account and he would tag the people based on figuring out who was most helpful as far as a particular idea.

Q Okay. And so is there a person who is
sort of the keeper of the ideas that tracks that? Is there is a spreadsheet?

A There would be somebody, but I'm not sure who it was in ' 05 and ' 06.

Q And is that a person who is also portfolio manager and analyst or is it somebody who wears a completely different hat?

A It could have been a portfolio manager, it could have been administrative.

Q Now, you mentioned before that they might upstream something to the main account or to the sector heads. What does that mean?

A Well, sector heads, what I did in 2009 was to, because we have 100 portfolio managers and probably 150 analysts on top of that, and it was just too many people for me to talk to, so what I wanted to do was make my life a lot easier and also, you know, put our best people in those particular verticals and sectors to be able to talk to people who are experts, and they're both doing the same sort of sector, so therefore they"re doing the same type of analysis in a particular group, so you get a two-way conversation going on, and $I$ just thought it was a much more efficient structure. Typically consultants will tell you never to have more than 10
points of contacts, and I certainly had a lot more than that.

Okay. That was something that didn't exist in '05, '06 -- '03 to '06, right?

A Well, what we did was -- that is correct. At different points along the way we might have had people either in the cohen account, being a PM or sort of a sub-PM in the account, or there would be -- at other times there would be what I would call conduits, people who would talk to the people. And then if they thought it was a reasonable idea they might pass it to me to put in the Cohen account.

Q So you mentioned -- so at that point in time there only would have been -- they would have been upstreaming any ideas they have to somebody under your umbrella of the Cohen account?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: That's correct.
BY MR. BOWE:
Q Is the Cohen account also what you described as the main account?

A That is correct.
Q Is it also referred to as the house account?

A We never referred to it as that.
Q Is there some reason no one ever refers to it as the house account?

A It's just the way it works.
Q There's nothing that -- there's nothing else that's called the house account?

A Well, there's a firm account.
Q Okay.
A And typically used a lot less and it's just -- you know, if we wanted to size something up or, you know, maybe bigger than how I want it expressed in a typical Cohen account, and that would be paid on a much -- what $I$ would call a one-off situation.

Q Okay. So let me ask the question this way so I can understand this. So the firm account -- we're talking about what you're referring to as accounts, so I'm not sure I understand what you're referring to as accounts. This is basically -- it's all the same capital that's under the S.A.C. umbrella it's just different sort of accounting buckets?

A Exactly.
Q So why would you then put some -- you say $I$ would put something in a one off basis in a
firm account, if $I$ wanted to size it up more then I would have it in the Cohen account.

Why would any of that matter?
A More probably for my own personal portfolio construction, I just wanted to see my -- I didn't want to be that maybe -- if we size something up maybe bigger than what we would normally would do I didn't want to see it that way and I would treat it differently.

Q Okay. So were all the same people working on it the same people who are in the Cohen account?

A Excuse me?
Q Are all the same people who were working on that responsible for it still the people who are in your Cohen account?

A Or it -- that's one way of doing it, or that I'm working with a particular portfolio manager or analyst in the firm and sizing it up because it might be a longer term situation, something we would want to hold on for a long time.

Q Okay. When you said -- when I asked you was there something else that you called the house account, you said there's the firm account? A That's right.

Q Is the firm account like an existing account?

A Yes.
Q All right. And so there isn't sort of an idea one account, idea two account, you just refer to those as the firm account, there is the firm account that you put these one-off ideas into?

A That's correct.
Q Is that sometimes referred to as the house account?

A I've never heard that term used.
Q Now, whose capital goes into the firm account?

A It will be the firm's capital.

Q
Okay. But as I understand it, you have 100 -- for every $\$ 100$ you have that you're managing, all of that money -- some money of that might be in cash, but the rest of it that's being managed is being allocated throughout the portfolio managers; is that right?

A That's correct.
Q So when you have a one off opportunity on the firm account, who -- from whose account and managed money is that going to be?

A That would be a totally separate

London, that would be a little tougher.
Q Right. Now, another way you do it is you have as a regular matter, you hold calls on Sunday nights, right?

A That's correct.
Q How long have you done that?
A I've been doing that since I started the firm.

Q Okay. And describe for me that process.

A That process is where I will -- I get people's writeups typically over the weekend, and if it's something that $I$ want to ask them about, or somebody who in general I have a high regard for, I would want to speak to them on Sunday night to talk about, you know, whatever ideas or thoughts on their sectors I think are relevant.

Q So is there a regular -- do you go through a regular list of all of your portfolio mangers on Sunday night?

A I typically don't -- I can't get to all of them. So I'll talk to, you know -- it will move around, but I'll talk to various people.

Q You probably talk to -- you start at the top, the guys who are the biggest -- biggest
know how it was set up at that time, where it suggested that they were aware of this Gwynn report coming out.

Q Okay. Now, did you ever authorize payments to Morgan Keegan -- excuse me -- for work John Gwynn did?

A I never authorized, no.
Q Are there people in your account who have done that?

A I have no idea, and I doubt it.
Q Okay. Do you -- what types of -- let me withdraw it. Let's back up a bit.

Why would you be making payments to
Morgan Keegan?
MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
MR. CURRIE: Form.
THE WITNESS: The only thing that I
would know that we would do with Morgan
Keegan, they're a broker-dealer, and so it is conceivable we were paying them commissions. BY MR. BOWE:

Q And when you say "paying them commissions," what do you mean?

A Meaning that when we would execute an order, we would execute through Morgan Keegan, and
they would earn a commission.
Q Are there times you execute orders
through a fund simply to pay them commissions?
MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
MR. CURRIE: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: It certainly is possible. I mean, if -- if we're getting research from them and we're not paying them what they think they ought to get -- I mean, there's always conversations. Brokers always want to get paid more money for their services.

BY MR. BOWE:
Q Okay. When you say they're providing research and they're not happy with the compensation, what do you mean "their compensation"?

A I know the head of my trading desk has many meetings where if there's a concern from the other side that they're not being fairly compensated for the services that they provide, and it could be corporate access, it could be research, it could be -- and so, you know, that's -- that's something that -- it happens every once in a while, sure.

Q What do you mean by "corporate access"?
A Excuse me?
Q Sure.

A Corporate access is typically when, you know, we try to get meetings when a broker holds a conference or they"re bringing in a particular company for dinner or something that hopefully one of our people will have the ability to be at the dinner, to be at the conference and meet with the company.

Q Okay. And when you said "research," you mean what?

A Research might be their, you know, the research that a particular broker-dealer sends out to their clients or it could be corporate access.

Q Is there anything else that you would be paying them commissions for?

A We pay prime broker, you know, for clearing our trades and settling our trades.

Q Did you ever use Morgan Keegan as a prime broker?

A I don't believe so.
Q So if you were paying commissions to Morgan Keegan, it would have been for corporate access or for research?

A Most likely.
$Q$ Okay. Now, with respect to research, why would you be paying them an amount of money for
research if your client and every client gets the research?

A Well, first, if your client -- first, I don't know -- I assume -- I don't know if every client gets the research we get. Okay? I assume they do. I'm not sure how they distribute at Morgan Keegan, and -- but if we're happy with our relationship -- it also has -- my trading desk manager decides what's the appropriate commission to pay to the firm on a yearly base.

Q No, I understand that, and we'll get to sort of who decides and whatnot. What I'm trying to understand is why is it even -- maybe it's not complicated but why is it really an issue?

A Because --
Q Let me just finish my question. Why is there someone who has to decide how much money someone gets for research, whereas a layman might think, look, Morgan Keegan puts out a report, the report goes out, you get it, everyone gets it; why does someone want to call you up and say you haven't sent me enough money?

A Because that's the way broker-dealers typically work. And however they -- I mean, our analysts and portfolio managers could be talking to
their analysts, and if we call them for something, if they're responsive to us, there will be another form of research that, you know, we would pay for.

Q Okay. So in other words, you can call the analyst up on the phone and ask him questions?

A Absolutely.
Q And depending on how responsive he was to you, he would expect to get, hopefully, better commissions, fair?

A Well, I think the answer is we have a broker vote at the end of the year, and certainly, you know, that's another tool that's used to decide who is most helpful and who is most, you know, responsive to our needs.

Q When you said "a broker vote," what do you mean?

A Typically, we'll vote -- how responsive each firm is with which set, with S.A.C. It comes from our portfolio mangers, their are perceptions of how well they're being serviced and they get a Corporate access, that type of stuff.

Q Okay. So before you said there's a guy on the trading desk who handles this. Is this in addition to that?

A He would include that in his
decision-making.
Q Okay. So the ultimate decision-maker is the guy on the trading desk?

A That's correct.
Q Okay. And you have an internal sort of straw poll, if you will, as to who's most responsive and provides the best service?

A That's correct.
Q And then the head of trading, does he talk to you and other people in management when he's going to whack up these issues?

A He doesn't talk to me, but he will discuss it with management and consult with the portfolio mangers to make sure he's making a correct decision.

Q Okay. So getting back to my original question, then it is the case that when you have a research analyst at a firm, that he understands that there is a potential upside in the form of commissions to pick up the phone and talk to S.A.C., right?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
MR. CURRIE: Object to form.
THE WITNESS: I mean, the answer is, it could if the -- if we're not that -- if we
find the analyst particularly not that helpful or useful or we don't like his work or it turns out, you know, he makes poor recommendations, I mean, certainly we would probably not want to pay him.

BY MR. BOWE:
Q You wouldn't want to pay him if you called him and he never returned your call?

A Absolutely not.
Q Right.
A Yeah.
Q And the fact of the matter is that he has more of an incentive to call you back than he would if $I$ called him, fair?

A Unless you pay him enough money. The answer is, yes.

Q Right. And just to sort of get through the sort of pedestrian point I'm trying to get to, and that incentive is because he understands that as you will be making a decision about how much commissions to send to his firm, fair?

A That's fair.
Q Now, how does it work, though, in terms of -- so how does he, like the portfolio mangers at your firm who send an idea to you and someone tracks
it, what's this analyst's incentive -- withdrawn. Start a new question.

A broker-dealer has analysts, numerous analysts, some might be more responsive to S.A.C. than others or a better service to S.A.C. than others. How do you let their boss know on whose behalf or because of whom you're sending commissions?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: I wouldn't do it. Typically, it would be -- I mean, portfolio mangers may complain to their particular salesmen. It could be brought to my senior management's attention and there could be conversations with other firms, my trading desk guy may call his counterpart to let him know that there's a complaint.

BY MR. BOWE:
Q Okay. My point, though, I wasn't talking so much about the complaint side, although that's helpful to me, but on the side where a guy does a good job, where you find value in him and you decide you're going to send commissions over there, how does he get credit for that? Do you have to indicate that it's because of this guy or on his
behalf or something like that?
MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: I don't believe it works that way. I think it's more of a general sense of, you know, how the firm itself is responsive to our needs, not necessarily one particular situation.

BY MR. BOWE:
Q I've seen spreadsheets of Morgan Keegan that reflect commissions paid from S.A.C. to Morgan Keegan. They come from different accounts. How does that get -- why is that tracked like from whose account it's coming?

A Because it's a cost of doing business and the cost is being allocated. If a trade is done at Morgan Keegan, they executed the order, they would attach a commission to that, which would then be part of cost of the trade, which would then be charged to the particular trader.

Q Okay. Now, do you execute trades at broker dealers like a Morgan Keegan that you -- and have a commission associated with it that you could otherwise trade like in an electronic exchange for a far less or zero commission?

A Today that's true.

1

Q Okay. When wasn't it true?
A The electronic exchanges have been developing over the last five or ten years; and typically today, much more of our business is executed on the electronic exchanges.

Q Okay.
A And actually we can pay the brokers that way, too.

Q How so?
A We can pay them based on using their algorithms.

Q What do you mean?
A They have an algorithm. They have their own electronic execution platforms, and we just input it -- we can give them -- we have their algorithms on our desk that we can then execute; then they charge us a fee.

Q Okay. When you say "their algorithms," you mean for what, for like a trading strategy?

A No, just to execute an order.
Q Okay. But you can also use electronic exchanges that you don't have to pay any commission on, right?

A I'm not sure exactly how that works.
Q You understand that there are
electronic exchanges that have far less of a cost associated with executing a transaction, right?

A Yes. If you execute through a broker, it's typically more expensive than executing yourself on electronic exchange.

Q But nevertheless, you choose, from time to time, to execute with a broker at a higher expense because it's your way of compensating that broker for services?

A That's correct.
Q Do you know if -- now, you talked about having a vote at the end of the year. How does that impact commissions throughout the year?

A It certainly -- it's a way of when you have a discussion with a firm, if they're going to complain about the amount of money they've been paid, it's an input that is used to justify what we did, what we didn't.

Q Are you ever involved in those discussions?

A Almost never.
Q There was a time when you were?
A It was something that I passed on to other people.

Q Okay. When did you pass it on?

## to do that?

A The answer is, I believe that most of the money that he was making was his traditional style of technical analysis.

Q Okay. My question was, did you understand he was trying to move from being a trader to an investor?
A. He was trying to hire people and trying to do that. But he was small enough where I felt he could still generate enough profits in his traditional style that, you know, I'd earn an adequate return.

Q How did you -- how did you come to understand he was trying to trade -- he was trying to move from a trader to an investor?

A You know, you'd hear about him hiring people and trying to hire analysts.

Q Who did you hear that from?
A I don't remember.
Q You heard it from him?
A It could have been that he -- if he met with me, and we met every once in a while, not very often -- not very often at all. He might -- he might mention it, but more of I probably heard it from just the grapevine.

VIDEO OPERATOR: We have to change the tape.

MR. BOWE: Let's take a break to change the tape.

VIDEO OPERATOR: The time is approximately 11:36 a.m.

This ends tape one in the videotape deposition of Steven Cohen.

We are now off the record.
(Brief recess.)
VIDEO OPERATOR: The time is
approximately 11:54 a.m.
This begins tape two in the videotape
deposition of Steven Cohen.
We are back on the record.
BY MR. BOWE:

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    Q Mr. Cohen, are you familiar with the
term "edge"?
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A Yes, I am.
Q That's a word that you use at S.A.C., correct?

A I hate that word.
Q What's that word mean?
A It just means that somebody believes
that in a particular situation, stock, that the word
suggests that somehow their expectations are different than either investors' expectations or Wall Street's expectations.

Q They think they know something everyone else doesn't, right?

A You know, I think that's an over -- I think that's an incorrect characterization of the word.

Q I didn't mean to make it nefarious, but it's basically someone who's, as you said before, be consistent with someone who has a high conviction on something, right?

A Perhaps, yeah.
Q And so -- and so someone who's done the research and has information and done the analysis and thought something through and thinks that they know something the market hasn't taken into account, that will allow them to make a profit on a trade, right?

A Well, or -- yes. Their work suggests that what they think is possible might be different, or the risk reward may make it worth it to, you know, to buy the stock or sell the stock.

Q Now, when you talked to -- what other funds do you talk to about investments?

A I personally talk to very few funds.
Q What about your team?
A My team today is actually very small, so I'm not sure what they do.

Q Okay. Well, back in 2002 through 2006, your group, at that point in time did you talk to other funds?

A I talked to -- I've always talked to very few funds.

Q Which funds then -- which funds did you typically talk to?

A I might talk to my eriend, Jay Goldman, he's someone I might talk to. I might talk to --

Q What fund is he at?
A Jay Goldman Associates. Who else do I talk to? I might talk to -- I mean, I might -- it's not something I did a lot. I mean, very few funds. I talked to a friend of mine, Ken Ginsberg, who is an old friend of mine from high school. And then very rarely would I talk to somebody in other firms, but it certainly happened.

Q Okay. Since it happened so rarely, can you tell me what funds?

A Well, I mean, Adam Sender, I mean there were times in my career where I've spoken to him.

Q Okay. What other funds?
A You know, there might have been a few communications with Dan Loeb in my career. Certainly Kingdon, I can remember talking to somebody over there.

Q What was that?
A Kingdon. We spoke to people over at Galleon. Now, can you -- is the question who I have spoken to over the last 25 years?

Q I'm asking you -- you said there were very few funds that you talked to, so I'm just asking which ones did you talk to. That was my question.

A I would say that that was a fair list of people that I might have talked to over the years.

Q Okay. And so that list I have is about six.

A Okay.
Q Is that about right?
A I mean, it could have been more.
Q Can you remember any others that you would typically talk to?

A Well, see, that's where my confusion is, when you say "typically talk to," I'm not sure
actually Sunday, probably the biggest day.
Q Okay. And it's your testimony that you're basically -- your main source of information, then, is not from the outside it's from your own people who are bringing in information from the outside?

A You're absolutely correct.
Q Okay. And that you -- your answer would be you're typically not talking to people outside the fund?

A That is not the way I conduct my day.
Q So you would not have many phone calls with Adam Sender during the trading day?

A I mean, if I had, you know, -depending -- I invested with Adam Sender probably in the late 905 , maybe 2000, somewhere in there. As the years went on, I spoke to him less and less.

Q Okay. So you're not going to have, if we get phone records from EXIS or from S.A.C. we shouldn't expect to see how many calls in a year with him?

A If two, one.
Q Two all year?
A Three. I mean, not a lot.
Q Now --

A Most of the conversations that I had with Adam Sender, you know, were -- most of them was when he needed to raise money.

Q How many of those conversations did you have?

A He always seemed like he needed money, so, I mean, it happened once every two years, once every year. Something -- he'd always encourage me to invest in his fund.

Q Okay. Now, there's people who you have on at the Cohen group who also talked to EXIS?

A I'm not aware of that.
Q Your testimony is you never became aware of any communications between traders at EXIS and your people in the Cohen group?

A That's correct.
Q Have you ever been to EXIS?

A Never.
Q When Adam Sender was at EXIS, did he ever come to S.A.C.?

A I don't remember.
Q Did anyone else from S.A.C. ever visit EXIS?

A It's conceivable my person who followed my outside investments might have done a diligence
call, due diligence call -- call or went over to the offices. I'm not sure.

Q Okay. The people who follow your outside investments are whom?

A It varied during the years.
Q Was it ever anyone from the Cohen group?

A No.
Q And who did those people who were monitoring your outside investments report to?

A Usually the senior management. That could be general counsel. It could be compliance. It could be, you know, in the period of time we were talking about, Brian Cohn.

Q Who is Brian Cohn?
A He was the CEO of my company.
Q And so he would have been monitoring outside performance?

A He would have been monitoring outside performance and/or getting reports from people who do due diligence saying they're outside investments.

Q And what would he be monitoring at these outside funds?

A Generally, typically what any investor would want to see. You know, is there a place? Is
it real? Sort of what their strategies are. How has it changed? Who have they hired? Just general due diligence that any fund would do just trying to understand, you know, how Adam's business was changing.
$Q \quad$ Why of all the places -- I take it you probably get requests to invest in lots of funds, right?

A Less than you would think.
Q How many typically in 2003, 2004?
A I don't remember.
Q More than a dozen?
A I don't remember.
Q You can't tell me whether it's more than five, more than six?

A I really can't, no.
Q Okay. So you weren't impressed with Adam Sender's investing, yet you decided to invest with him. Is that because you couldn"t find anyone else who you were more comfortable investing with?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
MR. SCHLESINGER: Objection.
THE WITNESS: The way I looked at Adam Sender was that it was my belief that the way he was running his money that his trading
style would cushion any bad investing decisions, and therefore, I had adequate profit cushion, based on my perception of how he traded, that the risk of losing money was less than I would -- would be less -- would be minimal.

BY MR. BOWE:
Q What about the chances of making money?

A Well, the answer is, Adam was certainly a moneymaker, and -- when he worked for me, and so as long as he didn't grow the business too large, my feeling was it would be a good investment.

Q Did you express this to Mr. Cohn?
A Sure.
Q Okay. And did he understand what the expectation was?

A I believe so.
Q Okay. And EXIS represented to you that, in fact, they were going to follow what you called the trading strategy, right?

A I understood -- well, I thought I understood what -- how he conducted his business.

Q Okay. And is that how he expressed that he was going to conduct his business?

A What was that?

1

Q As trading strategy? .
A Generally, as a trading strategy.
Q Okay. Not as a -- a value strategy, right?

A There's no way I would ever consider Adam a value investor.

Okay. Now, you understood that while you had money invested with him he suffered substantial losses on a very large position in RIM, right?

A That is correct.
Q And that was a position that he bought as a value position, was going to hold and thought it was going to go down, right?

A I didn't get into that level of detail with Adam. I mean, actually, I heard about his RIM losses not directly, probably, but indirectly.

Q From whom?
A I don't remember who.
Q Someone outside the firm?
A There were -- there was talk in the marketplace that he had suffered a big loss.

2 And how would you hear that talk?
A Typically people talk about when someone is doing poorly, or maybe he was talking. I
something. Or it might have come from my due diligence -- just from the reports. I just don't remember.

BY MR. BOWE:
Q Okay. It might have come from all those people who have their ears to the ground, but just so I'm clear, you're not suggesting that you had anything more than you described before, and that is minimal interaction with the market?

A That's correct.
Q Now, you decided to continue investing with Mr. Sender even though he suffered those substantial losses in RIM, right?

A I don't remember how exactly we handled it. I believe he came to me at some point and suggested that he made a mistake -- actually, I think we might have pulled money from him and then he came back and he said he was going to set up a special strategy where he'd go back to his roots and I can invest in that. And so when that happened, how that happened, what years it happened are unclear to me today.

Q Okay. Do you recall that you were originally in a fund called the Differential Fund and you got moved into a fund called the Walrus

Fund?
A That's probably what I'm talking about.
Q And you recall, the transfer happened in '04?

A I don't know what year it happened, but I'll assume that your characterization is correct.

Q Okay. And one of the things you discussed with him in those -- in those communications about whether you would stay in under those circumstances was the fact that he was going to go back to -- he was going to get away from what he did with RIM and go back to being a trader, right?

A That's correct.
Q And that gave you comfort, right?
A Yes.
Q Now, you understand that in ' 05 he went back to taking a very large position in a particular stock, right?

MR. SCHLESINGER: Objection.
THE WITNESS: I'm not -- you know, I
know about Fairfax because we've been talking about it, but I don't know if that's the stock you're talking about.

BY MR. BOWE:
Q Okay. Well, by '05, by the end of '05
he had 35 percent of his portfolio in Fairfax.
MR. SCHLESINGER: Objection.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
BY MR. BOWE:
Q You understood that, right?
A I didn't -- I mean, if you asked me, I didn't know it was that big.

Q Are you surprised that it was that big?
A I think it's a very large number.
Q And you're aware, however, that he provided statements to S.A.C. where he showed those positions, are you not?

MR. KLOTZ: Objection to form.
THE WITNESS: I'm not sure if that's
true. He probably would have gotten a return statement. I'm not sure it would have stated --

BY MR. BOWE:
Q Did he provide you -- I'm sorry, finish up.

A I'm not sure he would have provided position by position transparency.

Q He provided you with year end financial

Q Okay. But it would be inconsistent with what you had originally talked to him about when you agreed to continue investing with him to have 35 percent of the Walrus Fund in Fairfax?

A If he had 35 percent of the Walrus Fund in Fairfax, that would be inconsistent.

Q Okay. And it's your testimony that he never came to you at any point and said, I know I told you that $I$ was just going to be a trader, but I'm going to go and take another flyer on a particular position and really load up on it; he never told you anything like that?

MR. SCHLESINGER: Objection.
THE WITNESS: He never told me anything like that. BY MR. BOWE:

Q He never told anyone at S.A.C. that?
A Not that I'm aware.
Q So if he went and did that, he did that -- basically he had misrepresented what he was going to do S.A.C.?

MR. SCHLESINGER: Objection.
THE WITNESS: That would have been a surprise to me.

BY MR. BOWE:

> Q It would be inconsistent of what he told you he was going to do?
> A $\quad$ It would be inconsistent.
> Q portfolio manager who you entrusted money to was going to make a dramatic change in their strategy like that, that they told you they were going to do, that they would let you know about that?

A It would certainly be -- that would be a red flag to me.

Q Well, if you were going to make such a change, you would let your investors know, right?

A If I were going to -- I mean, we're speculating now. I can think of reasons why -- let me state it personally as an investor in EXIS, in the Walrus Fund, that to have 35 percent of Fairfax would be not what I had hoped -- hoped for him to do.

Q Right. And not what he told you he was going to do?

A That's right.
Q And if he was going to do something other than what he told you he was going to do, as an investor in the Walrus Fund, you would have

BY MR. BOWE:
Q Sir, when would you get -- you said you might have gotten quarterly reports from him. When would they typically come?

A The only reason $I$ said that is because we send quarterly reports to my investors.

Q And do you ever have an investor call and ask you what the results were?

A Investors do call on a monthly basis.
Q They don't always wait for the

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financials, right?
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A Absolutely.
Q Now, in the beginning of '06, you had dinner with Mr. Sender, right?

A I had dinner with Adam Sender at some point. I mean, I don't know if it was the beginning of ' 06.

Q Okay. And during that meeting, you recall he wanted to talk about Fairfax?

A That -- the only thing I remember, I don't remember him actually bringing -- I knew he brought it up at some point. I had no interest in it and -- but my guess is that dinner was more about trying to persuade me to keep money in the fund or whatever. I mean, I'm not sure why I actually took
the dinner date other than $I$ just knew him.
Q Okay. And Mr. Heller was at that dinner, right?

A I don't remember for sure.
Q Okay. Do you have any -- do you have any recollection whatsoever that he was at a dinner with you and Mr. Sender?

A You know, in retrospect, I heard about it, but I don't remember if I -- I'm not sure I would have remembered if my memory was jogged.
$Q \quad$ Okay. Now, your recollection is that you met with him and the discussion was he wanted you to keep your money in the fund, right?

A I'm not sure -- I don't remember the discussion.

Q Okay. The -- when you said you recall he wanted to talk to you about Fairfax and you weren't interested. You didn't tell him to shut up and don't say anything, did you?

A I didn't -- I mean, I didn't want to talk about Fairfax.
$Q$ Did you tell him, hey, stop, I don't want to talk about it?

A I don't remember.
Q A guy who's running a fund that you

1 have an investment in comes in and he has 35 percent 2 of his fund in a stock and he says I want to tell 3 you about this stock, you'd hear him out, right? BY MR. BOWE:

Q You'd tell him, look, I don't want to hear about that, let's talk about baseball?

A I mean, first -- I don't know how big his fund was. Second, it wasn't a name I cared about.

Q Do you recall telling him, stop, shut up, I don't want to hear about it?

A I don't remember.
Q You don't remember what happened at that dinner other than he wanted to talk to you about Fairfax, and you weren't interested in Fairfax?

A That's your characterization. I'm not sure when he might have mentioned Fairfax.

Q Okay. Do you recall him mentioning Fairfax in the context of trying to get you to keep your money in the fund?

A I don't remember. I do not remember.
Q Okay. Do you recall that in ' 05 he had

BY MR. BOWE:
Q Okay. That wasn't my question. You had a dinner with him and you had some other time when he wanted to talk to you about Fairfax and you got a Bloomberg. We know those things, right?

MR. KLOTZ: Objection.
MR. SCHLESINGER: Objection.
MR. KLOTZ: You're misstating what he testified, and I'm going to put it on the record. Mr. Cohen was quite clear that he is not certain whether Fairfax came up at a dinner or on some other occasion. You're now trying to characterize it as two different times when it came up. He was quite clear it was only once. He just couldn't place it.

BY MR. BOWE:
Q Mr. Cohen, you had an instance where you had an in-person meeting with Mr. Sender, correct, where he wanted to talk about Fairfax, right?

A I don't know what the meeting was about. We had dinner.

Q You did testify that there was a time when he wanted to talk to you about Fairfax; is that not your testimony?

A There was a time somewhere that he wanted to talk. I'm not sure it was at the dinner.

Q It might have been -- you might have had a different meeting with him, sometime other than the dinner?

A No. No. We didn't have meetings like that.

Q So if it wasn't at the dinner and he wanted to talk to you about this, was it on the phone he wanted to talk to you about?

A Well, you know, counsel has shown me either one or two Bloombergs where he tried to talk to me on it.

Q Okay. So is there anything --
A When I say "talk," he tried to communicate through e-mail, Bloomberg, whatever you call it.

Q Okay. When -- when -- well, you wouldn't dispute any testimony that he tried to talk to you at the dinner, would you?

A I just don't remember.
Q You don't remember one way or the other?

A That's right.
Q And you don't remember whether at

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exact investment.
    Q Do you recall it was over $200 million?
    A It could have been.
Q
Did you talk to Roberto Mignone more often than you did Mr. Sender?
A I almost never spoke to Roberto Mignone.
Q When did you talk to Roberto Mignone.
A Maybe once in a while we would have dinner. Maybe once a year, once every two years. I invested with Roberto when he started his fund. I was one of his original investors. As the years went by, communication, which wasn't -- we rarely talked to begin with. The years went by, it became almost non-existent.
Q And you invested in his fund at the end of '05, right?
A Yeah, but I think we were invested before that with him, in some manner.
Q He was managing money for you before then, right?
A Yeah, probably a managed account. Yes.
Q And then he opened up his own fund, right?
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A Well, he had his own fund, and we were
a managed account. I believe what happened was we -- he wanted us to, instead of having a managed account, just invest in his own fund.

Q And did you do that?
A Yes.
Q Now, and your testimony is you didn't talk to him very often, right?

A Almost never.
Q Okay. If you had a quarter of a billion dollars invested in a fund, would that be a fund where people would be monitoring?

A I would certainly have people -- we would be getting results from him.

Q And with respect to both Mr. Mignone and Mr. Sender you were paying them management fees and success fees, right?

A Typical hedge fund fees.
Q And what are those?
A It could run 1 to 2 percent assets on the management and then incentive fees. I think Adam actually I paid -- Adam was more of a trader. We probably paid him more than Roberto, who was more of a traditional investor.

Q Okay. And you paid Adam up to 50 percent, right?

A I believe so.
Q That's 50 percent of profit, right?
A That's correct.
Q And why -- why did he get more?
Because he was a trader?
A Typically, the hope was that, you know, he moved his money around, therefore, he wasn't going to run a lot of money and therefore it could earn a higher return.

Q When you say "he wasn't going to run a lot of money," you mean he was going to have a smaller fund?

A Typically, that's correct.
Q Because he would be more nimble?
A That's correct.
Q Now, did you respect Roberto Mignone's opinion with respect to investing?

A I think Roberto was one of the great investors that I've seen.

Q So if Mr. Mignone had a view about a particular stock or something he wanted to share with you, that would be something you would listen to, right?

A I would put more weight on it, yes.
Q You wouldn't tell him you're not
interested in hearing his views, right?
A If he wanted to talk about something, I would listen.

Q Have you ever been involved in conversations with Mr. Mignone of that nature where he says he wants to talk to you about a particular stock?

A He was very closed in that regard, so we would have dinner maybe once a year and, you know, he might have talked about one or two situations, but Roberto was pretty tight-lipped.

Q Would there be any reason why in the summer of ' 06 Mr . Sender, who was managing your money, would have been out there telling the marketplace his views as to Fairfax?

MR. SCHLESINGER: Objection.
THE WITNESS: I have no idea why he would be doing that. BY MR. BOWE:

Q You can't think about any ideas about that?

A You're asking me to speculate what's going on in his mind. I have no idea.

Q I'm asking you as someone who manages money, who knows the markets, was it irrational for
so why don't we take a --
MR. KLOTZ: A lunch break.
VIDEO OPERATOR: The time is approximately 1:14 p.m.

This ends tape 2 in the videotape deposition of Steven Cohen. We're now off the record.
(Lunch recess.)
VIDEO OPERATOR: The time is approximately 1:58 p.m.

This begins tape 3 in the videotape deposition of Steven Cohen.

We are back on the record.
BY MR. BOWE:
Q Mr. Cohen, you mentioned the rates that Mr. Sender and Mr. Bridger charged for their management. During this period, what was the typical rate that S.A.C. charged for management?

A It would have been -- in that period it would have been 3 and 50 .

Q So it was a 3 percent management fee of all the assets under management and a 50 percent clip of profit, correct?

A That is correct.
Q Now, describe for me briefly the

1 shows either meetings or reminders to call or appointments for lunch with Mr . Contogouris, and the names associated with these are either Jane Corcoran or Peter Nussbaum. Do you have any reason -- and they go from April 03 through, I think, October of '03.

Do you know what it was that Mr. Contogouris was meeting people at S.A.C. about during the course of those many months?

MR. KLOTZ: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: The only knowledge I have is that Peter Nussbaum was the guy that, you know, you handle this situation with Spyro; and outside of that $I$ just gave it to him and you do what you want.

BY MR. BOWE:
Q And a lot of these meetings appear to be in New York. Is that -- was the office in New York at 540 --

A Yes, we have an office at 540 , yes.
Q 540 what?
A Madison.
Q On the eighth floor, is that one of your floors?

A We have offices on the eighth floor.

Q Do you have any reason to understand why Mr. Contogouris would be visiting 540 Madison in '03?

A Well, I know today 540 Madison was the offices of Sigma, okay, and so I assume it was Sigma then, also.

Q Did Mr. Nussbaum have an office at Sigma?

A He -- I believe he didn't.
Q Okay. Did any legal -- was there any
legal in Sigma?
A I don't believe there were legal people on that floor.

Q Okay. And you don't know who Jane
Corcoran is?
A I don't know who she is.
Q Was there any other -- was there any
other group that was at 540 Madison other than Sigma during the period covered by the complaint?

A I don't believe so.
(Outlook appointment document,
SAC0000319, was marked Cohen-4 for
identification.)
BY MR. BOWE:
Q I put in front of you a -- as Exhibit 4

Q Because he doesn't say here that he talked to you, he says he has you calling?

A Okay. I never spoke to him and I never called him.

Q Okay. Now, -- so if he talked to Mr. Jeff Perry about this at the time and told him you were calling, he would be lying to Mr. Perry, too?

A That's what it looks like.
Q Do you know whether anyone at S.A.C. was calling him during this time?

A I was told through counsel that there was another analyst/ -- no, he wasn't running a portfolio manager; an analyst who might have been talking to him.

Q Who is that?
A A guy name Richard Maraviglia.
Q Did he work for you?
A He worked in my -- Intrinsic, so essentially he was an analyst for me.

Q Did he report to you?
A He didn't report directly to me.
Q Do you know -- you don't have any
information about whether he -- you personally didn't talk to him about any communications with Mr.

A No, I don't.
Q Would there be any reason why, when you said he worked at Intrinsic -- what was Intrinsic in 2006?

A Intrinsic was a division of S.A.C. and essentially it was me and a guy named Matt Grossman who was running that division.

Q And what was the idea behind Intrinsic?
A Essentially that we would have a group of analysts that would work solely for us as opposed to relying on portfolio managers and analysts in the firm to ferret out ideas.

Q Okay. So C.R. Intrinsic was your own -- your own analysts?

A That's right.
Q Did it -- did it have its own funds?
A It was allocated funds from S.A.C. Capital.

Q Okay. And then who made the investment decisions on that, you?

A It was me and Matt Grossman. Well, that's not true. There were other people who had the ability to invest.

Q Okay. Was it in the same office?
A It was in the same office, and some

|  |  | Page 608 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Q What accounted for that? |  |
| 2 | A Well, certainly performance, and |  |
| 3 | certainly a big -- we actually, I think in 2005 also |  |
| 4 | raised a new fund. |  |
| 5 | Q If you look at the next page, what's |  |
| 6 | it's title? |  |
| 7 | A Overview/Edge. |  |
| 8 | Q That's the word you said you hated, |  |
| 9 | right? |  |
| 10 | A I hate that word. |  |
| 11 | Q Why is it in your marketing material? |  |
| 12 | A That's a good question. It's a word |  |
| 13 | that's evolved over the last five years and probably |  |
| 14 | it's -- it doesn't really -- I think it denotes, you |  |
| 15 | know -- it doesn't really explain our investment |  |
| 16 | process very well. |  |
| 17 | Q So why did you put it in your marketing |  |
| 18 | material? |  |
| 19 | A Well, it's there, and like I said, it |  |
| 20 | was not a word that I will use today. |  |
| 21 | Q Okay. But you would use it in 2008? |  |
| 22 | A According to this document, it's there. |  |
| 23 | Q Okay. Why were you comfortable using |  |
|  | it in 2008 and not today? |  |
| 25 | A Well, the answer is these documents |  |

were formed by some of my people either in marketing or, you know, in the management staff, and obviously that's what they decided to use.

Q You reviewed these, though, right?
A I definitely saw this.
Q You didn't tell them to take out edge?
A I did not.
Q Okay. And they picked edge because that's what they thought was an appropriate overview of your firm, right?

A Well, I think it's a simplification of sort of how we go about our process.

Q Right. And the simplification -- one word simplification of what characterizes S.A.C. was edge, that's what they picked?

A Well, you know, it's certainly one word to use.

2 It's a word that the people who wanted to describe your fund to third-parties so they would give you money chose, right?

A That's what they chose, yes.
Q Is that still in your marketing material, as we sit here today, in 2011?

A I doubt it.
Q Is that because at some point you said

Q
Why is cross team communication on top?
A
I can't answer for that other than in general we prefer a firm that's collegial and there are some sectors -- and most sectors today that actually will talk amongst themselves.

Q Is it up there because cross team communication goes through the Cohen account?

A It's actually not -- I mean -- no, it would be up there just to suggest some of the ways that the firm benefits from the breadth and the depth of the talent.

Q Turn to page 9. This is strategies-global long/short equities. This is one of the strategies you're describing for investors, right?

A That's correct.
Q What does it say under the second section, on top of the second section?

A It says, Are you referring to S.A.C.'s edge?
$Q \quad$ Yep.
A Okay.
Q So once again, you chose to describe your advantage is your edge, right?

A This is a marketing document and
marketing people love to be vexy concise in how -so people get a message.

Q I understand. And the message you chose to present to investors was that your characteristic was edge?

A Well, you know, as you read down you start to understand what that means.

Q Okay. But the answer to my question is, yes, we did, right?

A That what?
Q That you did choose to use the word edge as you described it to investors?

A We chose to use the word edge.
Q All right. So if you look at the third arrow under S.A.C.'s edge, Research analysts have extensive contact with corporate management, vendors, consultants of other industry participants. Correct?

A That is correct.
Q And the point of this is that you're getting a lot of information from the outside, right?

A There's no doubt that we are doing significant research.

Q Then if you skip one, it says, Position

What does that mean?
A It means that the portfolio turns over on a regular basis.

Q What does it mean that it's high portfolio turnover?

A It's a term used. I mean, high is probably relative. To what I don't know.

Q You have no idea?
A No.
Q If you turn to page 17, under investment research, it talks about use of outside sources.

Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q Then it says -- skip one. Typical flow of an investment idea for inception to a trading position. It talks in the first paragraph about portfolio managers and their ideas being presented, analysts -- respected portfolio managers and the ideas they have the best probable -- probability adjusted risk to return ratios are selected for inclusion in the applicable portfolios. Then it says, Each portfolio group is further responsible for sharing high conviction ideas with Steve Cohen and his investment team in a hub and spoke trading
structure where Steve Cohen and his team are the hub of receiving information from the various spokes of investment managers. Steve Cohen and his team will then decide whether to include the idea in his portfolio as well.

That's an accurate description, correct?

A Yeah, I would say that's fairly accurate. It makes sense.

Q Look at the last page, 22. This is under the section, Business Continuity. If you look at the top box on page 22 , the second-to-last paragraph, it says, In addition, S.A.C. has full trade details for all activity by executing broker and by prime broker.

What does that mean full trade details for all activity by executing broker and prime broker?

A We were keeping our own records of all activity -- all transactions done by either an executing broker, which would be someone who would execute the order, or the prime broker where the trades would be settled and where our cash would be.

Q Okay. So you maintained there should be no records at your executing broker or your prime

FAIRFAX FINANCIAL HOLDINGS LTD., et al:

Plaintiffs,
v.

SAC CAPTTAL MANAGEMENT lle, edal.

Defendants.

DOCKETNO. MRS-L-2032-06

## Errata to the Deposition of Steven A. Cohen

April 29, 2011.
I wish to make the following changes for the following reasons:


SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME.
THS lite DAxor Juby, 2011
sulely $\frac{B a c c o}{\text { Notary Public }}$
 Shatia


